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ADOPTION AND TERMINATION

PROCEEDINGS IN WISCONSIN:
STRAINING THE WISDOM OF
SOLOMON
STEPHEN W. HAYES*
MICHAEL J. MORSE**

'"ndthe King said, 'Divide the living child in two, and
give halfto the one, and halfto the other."' I Kings 3:25.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no contested matter produces more joy, more
heartache, more judicial response and more legislative reaction than the battle waged between birth parents and prospective adoptive parents for the right to raise a child.
Decisions which are often made from the heart first and the
lawbook second have produced a circuitous and sometimes
precarious path for lawyers and judges alike to follow. As a
result, increasingly rigid concepts have been created to ease
the difficult burdens of decision makers and practitioners.
Those recent judicial and legislative efforts may have
wrought order from chaos at the expense of the best interest
of the child.
* B.A., DePauw University, 1966; J.D., University of Illinois, 1969; shareholder,
von Briesen & Redmond, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
** B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1978; J.D., Marquette University
Law School 1981; associate, von Briesen & Redmond, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Special acknowledgment is extended to William C. Pickering for his contributions
to this article.
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II. BACKGROUND
At a minimum, the birth parents, the child and the state
are involved in a termination and adoption proceeding.' If
the child has been living with others, the interests of potential adoptive or foster parents may also be involved.2 State
laws may require the involvement of other participants, such
as a guardian ad litem.3 Despite the many important and
often conflicting interests involved, courts and legislatures
often have focused on the biological parents at the expense
of the other parties. Consequently, the fundamental rights
of biological parents are typically safeguarded quite zealously in adoption or termination proceedings, while the
equally fundamental and often conflicting rights of other
parties, most importantly those of the child, may be
ignored.4
A. ParentalRights Under Common Law
In primitive societies, the larger kinship group rather
than the family was the basic societal unit.5 If the immediate
family was dissolved for some reason, the children in such
societies would remain in the clan in which they had been
raised. Because the child's family was considered to be the
clan, the loss of a birth parent had little legal or official im-

pact on the child.6

American society, on the other hand, has generally
placed great emphasis on the family 7 and viewed the parents
as the primary figure in child development.8 Anglo-Ameri1. State v. McMaster, 259 Or. 291, 296, 486 P.2d 567, 569 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 48.01(2) (1981-1982) (providing that one of the interests
the court should consider in adoption proceedings is that of potential adoptive
parents).
3. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 48.23, 48.235 (1981-1982).
4. Comment, Termination of ParentalRights in Adoption Cases: Focusingon the
Child, 14 J. FAM. LAW 547, 550-51 (1975).

5. Comment, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
ThirdParties, 73 YALE L.J. 150 (1963).
6. Id at 151 n.1.
7. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, has noted that "[t]he unit of the
state is the individual, its foundation the family ... [to] preserve the family is one of
the basic principles for which organized government is established." Lacher v. Venus,
177 Wis. 558, 569, 188 N.W. 613, 617 (1922).
8. For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) the United
States Supreme Court noted that "custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
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can culture has generally recognized the exclusive authority
of parents to govern and control their children.9 Society has
also recognized that this authority gives the parent certain
interests including the psychological benefits which may
arise from parenthood, 0 the right to administer discipline
and expect obedience, 1the duty to provide care and to nurthe inture the child 2 and the correlative right to preserve
3
tegrity and the autonomy of the family unit.
The position of parents at common law was a mix of a
rather romantic view of parenthood with contract and property law principles. Society recognized that, due to their
"want and weaknesses,"' 4 children had to be given care. Society then idealistically assumed that nature had designated
the biological parents the most fit and proper persons to provide that care. 15 The contractual underpinning of commonlaw parental rights is implicit in the view that the parents
were entitled to the custody of the child's person and to the
value of the child's labor and services as a quid pro quo for6
the parental obligation to maintain and educate the child.'
Since the parents' right to their children was considered akin
that
to that of property owners to their chattels, it followed
7
the parents' interests were of primary concern.'
Parenthood also engendered specific obligations under
the common law, including the duty to maintain and eduthe parents." Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972), the Court
noted that: "[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition
of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."
9. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59, 64 (1874).
10. See Comment, supra note 5, at 151-52.
11. Id; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *203.
12. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
13. See, e.g., In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518, 526 (Alaska 1979); Bell, Termination of
ParentalRights, Recent Judicialand Legislative Trends, 30 EMORY L.J. 1065, 1085,
1090 (1981).
14. 2 J. KENT, supra note 11, at *189.
15. Id
16. Id at * 193. See also Markwell v. Pereles, 95 Wis. 406, 410-11, 69 N.W. 798,
799 (1897); Monaghan v. School Dist. No. 1, 38 Wis. 100, 105 (1875).
17. Cf. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975), affdmetL, 428 U.S.
901 (1976). It has also been suggested that custody law stems from the feudal concept
of the child as a chattel who represented important monetary interests. Sayre,Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 672, 675 (1942).
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cate the child while a minor and to make reasonable provisions to prepare the child to become a useful member of

society. 18 If the parents failed to discharge this obligation

while able to do so, or acted in a manner endangering the
health or morals of the child, they risked forfeiture of the
right to the value of the child's services1 9 and to the custody
of the child.20

The duty to educate biological offspring gave rise to a
parental obligation to society at large. The parents' failure
to adequately discharge that obligation worked a severe
hardship on society by depriving it of a "useful citizen" and
creating "a nuisance."'2 ' The duty to care for the child also

created a social obligation which could be enforced by third
parties who could collect from the parents the cost of providing necessities for the child.22
Judicial intrusion was exerted generally only against a

parent's custodial rights. At early common law, courts possessed the authority to remove a child from parental custody
when the child's morals, safety or other interests strongly required it.23 Courts, however, possessed no authority to sever
parental rights. Adoption or termination proceedings were

unknown at common law.24

Modem courts and legislatures have continued to recognize the fundamental nature of the interests biological parents have in their children.25 Parental rights have been

characterized as "more precious to many people than their
18. 2 J. KENT, supra note 11, at * 189; cf. McGoon v. Irvin, I Pin. 526 (1845).
19. Cf. Patek v. Plankinton Packing Co., 179 Wis. 442, 446, 190 N.W. 920, 922
(1923).
20. 2 J. KENT, supra note 11, at *205.
21. Id at *196.
22. See, e.g., Simpson Garment Co. v. Schultz, 182 Wis. 506, 509-10, 196 N.W.
783, 784 (1924); McGoon v. Irvin, 1 Pin. 526 (1845).
23. 2 J. KENT, supra note 11, at *205.
24. Estate of Topel, 32 Wis. 2d 223, 229, 145 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1966).
25. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Davis v.
Page, 618 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1980), a27'd inpart, vacatedandrev'd in parton rehj"
(en banc), 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981); In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518, 524-25 (Alaska
1979);In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, 916, 623 P.2d 198, 202, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 641
(1981); In re J.L.B., 182 Mont. 100, _, 594 P.2d 1127, 1136 (1979); In re William L.,
477 Penn. 322, 334, 383 A.2d 1228, 1235, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); In re
J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 133, 306 N.W.2d 46, 53 (1981).

1983]

TERMINA TING PARENTAL RIGHTS

right to life itself. ' 26 One court noted that "it is not unlikely
that many parents would choose to serve a prison sentence
rather than to lose the companionship and custody of their
children." 27 Parental rights justly deserve protection by the
legislature and judiciary. At what point, however, should
the sanctity of rights created by birth be disturbed and for
what purpose?
B. The Interests of the Child in Termination Proceedings
A child's interests within the family are many and varied.
Some, though certainly not all, of these interests may coincide with parental interests. One such interest, to remain
with one's biological parents and siblings, has been recognized as "'the other side of the coin which asserts the natural right of a parent to custody and guardianship over
children.' "28 Another is the mutual right of parent and
child to inherit from one another.2 9 Finally, both parent and
child possess important coinciding interests in the protection
and maintenance of a viable family group provided that unit
is functioning properly to meet the needs of the child.30
A child also has certain interests which, when the family
unit is malfunctioning or nonexistent, may conflict with
those of a biological parent. Corresponding to common-law
parental obligations 3' is the child's right to support during
his minority and to an appropriate education. A child also
has a right to a safe and secure environment, 32 and to guidance, assistance and support when confronted with important personal matters.3 3 In addition, a child has an
26. In re Gibson, 4 Wash. App. 372, . 483 P.2d 131, 135 (1971).
27. Davis, 618 F.2d at 379.
28. Bell, supra note 13, at 1084 n.78 (quoting V. DEFRANCIS, TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS 15-16 (1971)).
29. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 852 (1981-1982); cf.In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908,
915, 623 P.2d 198, 202, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 641 (1981).
30. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973).
31. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
32. Hill v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 446, 451, 283 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Ct. App. 1979).
33. Keiter, Privacy, Children and Their Parents: R§flections On and Beyond the
Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459, 505 (1982).
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important interest in the treatment of medical and emotional
34
conditions, and freedom from harm, injury or neglect.
Even short of termination proceedings, the interests of
the child may clash in a significant manner with the interests
of the biological parent.35 When faced with these clashes,
courts have attempted to analyze and balance the interests
involved. In termination or adoption proceedings, however,
the important physical and psychological interests of the
child often are not adequately balanced with parental rights.
While giving lip service to the often silent interest of the
child, 36 courts and legislatures typically subordinate that interest to those of the biological parents, at least at the initial
stages of inquiry. In Wisconsin termination hearings, for example, the question of whether a proposed termination or
adoption will serve the best interests of the child is usually
not reached unless it has first been determined that the consent of the biological parents has either been obtained or can
be dispensed with.37 Other jurisdictions have presumed that
custody by the biological parent is invariably in the child's
best interest.38 The parental rights doctrine itself ignores the
child's interests and entitles biological parents to custody of
39
their offspring absent an affirmative showing of unfitness.
The practical effect of this is to condition the consideration
of the child's interests upon a prior finding of such parental
conduct as will justify dispensing with the biological parents'
consent to a termination or adoption. Although designated
by the legislature as the keystone for decision-making in
34. Bell, supra note 13, at 1084 n.78.
35. See Keiter, supra note 33 (discussing the conflicts between parental rights and
a child's privacy interest in recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving a
minor's right to an abortion). For a general discussion of the best interest doctrine in
custody disputes see McGough & Shindell, Coming ofAge: The Best Interest of the
Child Standardin Parent-ThirdParty Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209 (1978);
Comment, The Best Interest of the Child Doctrine in Wisconsin Custody Cases, 64
MARQ. L. REv. 343 (1980).
36. Sims v. State Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1191 (S.D. Tex.
1977); In re Angelia P., 28 Cal. 3d 908, _ 623 P.2d 198, 202, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637, 64142 (1981).
37. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 48.42, 48.427 (1981-1982).
38. See, e.g., Risting v. Sparboe, 179 Iowa 1133, 162 N.W. 592 (1917); Jackson v.
Jackson, 164 Kan. 391, 190 P.2d 426 (1948); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463
(1952).
39. Comment, supra note 5, at 152-53.
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Children's Code actions, the best interests of the child often
will not be directly addressed.4 °
C. PsychologicalParents
Unlike adults, children do not have a psychological conception of any relationship with others derived from bloodties until quite late in development.4 1 Children develop psychological attachments through day to day interchange with
the adults who care for them.42 It is the character and continuity of these psychological relationships which lead the
children to perceive their caretakers as their parents. This
perception, rather than the fact of biological parenthood, is
the basis of their relationship.43
Usually a child's biological, legal and psychological parents are one and the same. 44 Termination and adoption proceedings sever these roles and place them in different
individuals. Once a child is adopted, legal and psychological parenthood resides in the adoptive parent.
Although recognition is becoming more pronounced,
courts and legislatures have been slow to give credence to
the important role played by psychological parents. The
United States Supreme Court, for example, only recently
recognized the privacy rights of extended family members,45
and the child's right to remain with the psychological parents.46 The Court, however, has refused to place the interests
of foster parents on the same plane as those of biological
parents.47
Recently, section 48.01(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes was
amended to require courts to consider the interests of persons with whom the child has been placed for adoption.4
However, two recent decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme
40. Cf. Comment, supra note 4, at 560.
41. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 30, at 12-13.

42. Id
43. Read, Book Review, 13 J. FAm. L. 601, 602 (1973-74).
44. Muench &Levy, PsychologicalParentage,
A NaturalRight, 13 FAM. L.Q. 129,
152-53 (1979).
45. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
46. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
47. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
48. The recent amendments to Wis. STAT. § 48.01(2) (1981-1982) require judicial
consideration of the interest of persons "with whom the child has been placed for
adoption." Act of Nov. 27, 1981, ch. 81, § 2, 1981 Wis. Laws 726, 727.
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Court49 suggest that the court may be deviating from the nationwide trend recognizing the importance of psychological
parents.50 Earlier, the interests of the psychological parent
51
had been at least implicitly recognized by the court.
D. Guardian ad Litem
1. The Role of the Guardian ad Litem in Termination
Proceedings
A guardian ad litem is an attorney appointed to protect
the interests of a minor in a specific court proceeding.52 The
attorney's role is that of an advocate for the child's best interests.53 In contested adoptions and in cases dealing with
involuntary termination of parental rights, appointment of
legal counsel or a guardian ad litem for the minor child is
mandatory.54 When the parent in a termination proceeding
is a minor, the parent must also be served by a guardian ad
55
litem
49. In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 140, 306 N.W.2d 46, 56 (1981); In re Adoption
of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980), rev'g 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d
591 (Ct. App. 1980). In J.L.W the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed on constitutional grounds and required that the unfitness of the birth mother be found before
terminating her rights. Although J.L. W. was the first Wisconsin case to impose this
additional burden, there was neither prospective application of the rule nor a remand
to permit the petitioners in favor of termination of the mother's rights an opportunity
to put in evidence of the mother's unfitness. This failure to remand following reversal
may be an abandonment by the court of support for the psychological parent concept.
50. See Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382 (Alaska 1977);Inre D.L.C., 54 Cal. App.
3d 840, 126 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1976); Skubas v. Skubas, 31 Conn. Supp. 340, 330 A.2d
105 (1974); In re Adoption of J.S.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. 1977); Rodriquez v.
Koschny, 57 1M1.
App. 3d 355, 373 N.E.2d 47 (1948); In re Gibson, 239 N.W.2d 540
(Iowa 1976); In re Weldon, 397 Mich. 225, 244 N.W.2d 827 (1976); In re One Child,
154 N.J. Super. 513, 381 A.2d 1232 (1977); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356
N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976); In re K.P., 267 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1978); Burnette
v. Wahl,284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978); In re Adoption of Sturgeon, - Pa. Super.
445 A.2d 1314 (1982); Moore y.Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 408, 526 P.2d 893 (1974).
51. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d 64, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975);
In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973); In re Adoption of
Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W.2d 759 (1951), reh~' denied, 260 Wis. 69a, 51 N.W.2d
713 (1952).
52. Wis. STAT. § 48.02(8) (1981-1982).
53. In re Termination of Parental Rights to Kegel, 85 Wis. 2d 574, 583, 271
N.W.2d 114, 118 (1978). The same duty is imposed in divorce custody disputes. See,
e.g., Allen v. Allen, 78 Wis. 2d 263, 254 N.W.2d 244 (1977); deMontigny v. deMontigny, 70 Wis. 2d 131, 233 N.W.2d 463 (1975); Wis. STAT. § 767.045 (1981-1982).
54. Wis. STAT. § 48.23(1)(d), (2)(a) (1981-1982).
55. Id § 48.23(2).
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The guardian ad litem has a duty to investigate the facts,
consult with the child when possible, gather evidence and
call and cross-examine witnesses. 6 The guardian also must
recommend to the court the disposition which is in the best
interests of the child. 7 This recommendation is presumed to
be in the child's best interests unless a fair preponderance of

the credible evidence supports a contrary determination.58
Because the guardian ad litem must function as a lawyer and

social worker, he or she occupies a unique position in termi-

nation proceedings. The guardian ad litem as court advi-

sor 59 potentially possesses power beyond that of other
lawyers in civil cases to affect the outcome of adoption or
termination proceedings.
2.

What Weight Must Be Given to the Recommendation
of the Guardian ad Litem?

Before 1954 no adoption could be granted without the
consent of the child's legal guardian.60 In 1955, however, the
56. See In re Termination of Parental Rights to Kegel, 85 Wis. 2d 574, 583, 271
N.W.2d 114, 118 (1978) (citing deMontigny v. deMontigny, 70 Wis. 2d 131, 136-42,
233 N.W.2d 463, 466-69 (1975)). See also Bahr v. Galonski, 80 Wis. 2d 72, 257
N.W.2d 869 (1977).
57. See Wis. STAT. § 48.85(1), (2) (1981-1982); In re Termination of Parental
Rights to Kegel, 85 Wis. 2d 574, 271 N.W.2d 114 (1978). Note that while § 48.85
clearly refers to the recommendation of the guardian, nowhere does the statute can
for the recommendation of the guardian ad litem. Without a discussion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has interpreted "guardian" in § 48.85 to include "guardian ad
litem." In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 543-46, 210 N.W.2d 865, 868-69
(1973).
58. WIS. STAT. § 48.85(2) (1981-1982).
59. The writers believe that there exists a conflict between the duty of the guardian ad litem to act as an advocate and the apparent duty under Wis. STAT. § 48.85(2)
(1981-1982) to provide impartial counsel to the court in the form of a recommendation. Wis. STAT. § 48.85(1) (1981-1982) requires the guardian (and by case law the
guardian ad litem) to file a recommendation with the court ten days before trial. By
necessity at least a tentative recommendation as to the ultimate disposition of the
child must be presented by counsel for the child before hearing the testimony of the
witnesses and viewing the exhibits admitted into evidence at trial.
The interrelationship between Wis. STAT. § 48.85(1), (2) (1981-1982) and case law
needs clarification. The duty of the guardian ad litem for the child in termination and
adoption matters should be clearly defined. Is the guardian an advocate, an assistant
to the court, or both?
As one writer has indicated, in divorce custody disputes the guardian ad litem
should not be considered an expert social worker or a counselor for the trial judge.
Cook, The Guardianad Litem - Duties, ProfessionalResponsibilitiesand Limitations
in Custody Cases, Wis. J. FAM. L., Dec. 1982, at 17. The same principle should be
applicable to adoption matters.
60. See In re Adoption of Tschudy, 267 Wis. 272, 65 N.W.2d 17 (1954).
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Wisconsin Legislature enacted section 48.85 which allowed a
trial court to dispense with the legal guardian's consent if the
legal guardian's refusal to consent was arbitrary, capricious
or not based on substantial evidence. 6 '
In 1959 the legislature revised that section to give presumptive weight to the legal guardian's recommendations
subject to rebuttal by a clear preponderance of the evidence.62 Subsequently, in 1969, a fair preponderance of the
credible evidence
was deemed sufficient to rebut the
63
presumption.
Wisconsin statutes do not expressly designate the weight
to be given to the opinion of a guardian ad litem. However,
in 1973 the Wisconsin Supreme Court recommended that
the opinion of the guardian ad litem be given the same
weight as that of a legal guardian under section 48.85(2) of
the Wisconsin Statutes.64 The court provided no rationale
for expanding the coverage of section 48.85(2) to include the
guardian ad litem, but simply stated that, "[i]t is true the
guardian ad litem's recommendation opposing the adoption
does not have the force and effect under present sec. 48.85(2)
that it formerly had. At one time the trial court in an adoption proceeding could not grant the petition over the objec' '65
tion of the guardian ad litem.
In the event the recommendation of the guardian ad litem does not support the petition for adoption, the court,
61. Wis. STAT. § 48.85 (1955). See also In re Adoption of Brown, 5 Wis. 2d 428,
92 N.W.2d 749 (1958); In re Adoption of Shields, 4 Wis. 2d 219, 89 N.W.2d 827
(1958).
62. Wis. STAT. § 48.85 (1959).
63. Wis. STAT. § 48.85 (1969).
64. In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
65. Id at 544, 210 N.W.2d at 867. In Tachick the court first applied the fair
preponderance test to the recommendation of a guardian ad litem in an adoption
proceeding. Application of the test to the recommendation of the guardian ad litem
in an adoption matter was further confirmed in In re Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis.
2d 64, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975). The same test was applied to an involuntary termination of parental rights proceeding in In re Termination of Parental Rights to Kegel,
85 Wis. 2d 574, 271 N.W.2d 114 (1978).
However, the court declined to address the application of the fair preponderance
test to the recommendation of the guardian ad litem in In re Adoption of R.P.R., 98
Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 83 (1980), rev'g 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App.
1980).
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according to the statute, must then hold a hearing to determine whether the best interests of the child would be served

by the proposed adoption.66 The statute does not specifically
indicate the procedure to be followed in a termination case.6 7
How the recommendation procedure of section 48.85 is to
dovetail with current termination rules is not clear.
III.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE INTERESTS INVOLVED
IN ADOPTION OR TERMINATION CASES

A. United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has long granted the
utmost deference to the position of parents within the family. In Meyer v. Nebraska68 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,69
the Court found that the right of parents to educate their
children was within the liberty interests protected by the
fourteenth amendment. More recently, the Court recognized as fundamental the parental interests in guiding the
religious upbringing of children.7 °

In contrast to its traditional deference to parental rights,
however, the Court has recently given at least implicit recog-

nition to other individuals whose interests may conflict with
those of the parents. The Court has, for example, recognized
that a family may include individuals other than or in addition to the biological parents and their immediate offspring.7 ' More importantly, the Court has recognized in
66. Wis. STAT. § 48.85(2) (1981-1982).
67. Id
68. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Meyer Court also recognized a corresponding parental duty under the natural law to provide the child with an education suitable to
his station in life.
69. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). An interesting sidelight to this case
involved the dissent of the late Justice William Douglas. Douglas' chief reason for
dissenting was his perception that the Court's analysis of the case as solely a contest
between parents and state ignored the children and their interests. In Justice Douglas' opinion, prior recognition of children's constitutional rights required that the
Court view the child as an independent entity with rights distinct from those of the
parents. Id at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977)
(recognizing that the foster family may be as or more important to a child than the
biological family when the foster family has been the only family the child has
known, implying that the foster parents may have a legally cognizable interest arising
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several recent cases challenging the right of a minor to an

abortion without prior parental consent that at certain points
parental interests must defer to a child's
individual and con72
stitutionally protected privacy rights.
Within the last ten years, beginning with Stanley v. Illinois,73 the Court has increasingly accepted for review adop-

tion 74 and parental termination 75 decisions. Analysis of
these cases suggests two important trends. First, it appears
that the Court is applying principles developed in early parental rights cases.76 In so doing, it has explicitly recognized

that the interests of the biological parent in termination and
adoption proceedings is a fundamental one, 77 entitled to def-

erence and protection by the state, absent powerful counter-

vailing interests.78 Second, complete application of these
protections has been extended to the interests of unwed fathers who have established familial relationships with their
children. 79
With few exceptions, the Court has viewed these cases as
being solely a contest between parent and state. 0 The Court

has recognized the importance of the state's parens patriae
from positive law, but also noting that any rights foster parents might have are secondary to those of biological parents); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (rejecting ordinance which narrowly defined "family" as nuclear family).
72. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132
(1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). These cases are important not only because of the Court's recognition that the interests of at least three
parties are involved (the parent, the state and the child), but also for the attempt to
weigh the interests and to fashion a remedy based on a perception of a constitutionally acceptable balance of the competing interests.
73. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
74. E.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978). Both cases involved the need to obtain the unwed father's consent to
an adoption.
75. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (constitutionally proper
burden of proof); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (indigent
parents do not have right to an attorney).
76. See, for example, Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651, or more recently, Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), for evidence of the Court's reliance on Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
77. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
78. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
79. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
80. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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interest in the well-being of the child"' and the state's fiscal
and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burdens
of the proceeding. 2 It has rejected the contention that these
interests necessarily conflict with parental interests 3 and
has
84
subordinated them to parental interests when they do.

Santosky v. Kramer85 is an exception to the Court's "parent versus state" approach. Prior to Santosky, the only recognition accorded to interests other than those of the parents
or the state in adoption or termination proceedings was that
given by justices dissenting from the majority analysis.8 6 In
Santosky, however, the Court included, for the first time,
analysis of interests beyond merely those of the state or

parents.
While the Santosky Court's initial analysis dealt in tradi-

tional "parent versus state" terms, the Court eventually addressed the question of the weight to be given to the interests
of the child and of foster parents in termination proceedings.
The Court rejected the argument that either interest should
be contrasted with those of the biological parents in the
factfinding stage of a termination proceeding. 7 However
substantial the interests of foster parents may be, the Court

explained, such interests are subservient to those of biologi-

cal parents when the rights of each conflict.88 Conflict be81. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 391 (1979).
82. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981).
83. Id at 31.
84. Id See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979).
85. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). See Note, 66 MARQ. L. REv. - (1983).
86. Justice Stevens, for example, recognized the interests of adoptive parents and
the child in his dissent in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,408-09 (1979) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See also Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban recognizing the child's
interest as well. Id at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The most thoughtful and thought
provoking dissent was that of Justice Rehnquist in Santosky, which argued that
proper analysis of termination proceedings involved a weighing and balancing of
countervailing interests of state, parent and child throughout the entire process, rejecting completely the majority's parent-centered analysis. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 77091 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759-60 (Court noted that the factfinding stage of
the New York proceeding put the state directly against the parent without focusing on
potentially conflicting interests of either the child or foster parents).
88. Id at 760-61. The Court reasoned that these interests were not implicated
directly in the factfinding stage. The child's interests, the Court concluded, are ade-
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tween the interests of the child and the parent, the Court
concluded, are not to be assumed until after a finding of parental unfitness. 89
The Court's departure from the "parent versus state" focus may have been a reaction to the dissent of Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Court's
characterization of the parent's interest as substantial and
constitutionally protected 90 and that the proper burden of
proof must allocate the risk of error among the various parties. 9' He disagreed, however, with the Court's assumption
that the child's interest in a termination proceeding coincides
with that of the parents.92
While conceding a mutual interest in preventing erroneous terminations, Justice Rehnquist noted that the child's interest is distinct from the parent's because it "exists only to
the extent that such a continuation would not be harmful to
him." 93 In addition, Justice Rehnquist suggested that an erroneous failure to terminate also would adversely affect important interests of the child.94 Consequently, he argued, a
child has interests in the factfinding phase of a termination
proceeding independent of and often contrary to, parental
interests.95 After balancing the child's and state's interests96
against those of the parents, Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the state had set a proper
burden of proof by allocating
97
the risk of error equally.
Equally important is the issue of the status of unwed fathers in adoption proceedings. In Stanley v. Illinois98 the
quately protected at the dispositional stage and suffer less onerous consequences of an
adverse decision than those of the biological parents.
89. Id at 760. The Court noted that the shared and vital interest in preventing
erroneous termination of the natural relation indicated a coincidence of interests until
the termination of the factfinding stage. See also id at 765.
90. Id at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. Id at 786-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Id at 788 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 788-89 & n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 788 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the majority's assertion that the state's
parens patriae interests in the child arose only after the factfinding stage. Id at 790
n.16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. Id at 790-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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Court held that a state could not deprive an unwed father of
the custody of children whom "he has sired and raised" 99
solely upon an assumption of unfitness derived from the
children's illegitimate status. A state statute allowing the
adoption of a child without consent of an unwed father who
had lived with and supported his children was held unconsti° in Caban v. Mohammed.'0 ' In contrast, a Georgia
tutional'O
statute which denied an unwed father this same right to consent to an adoption was upheld in Quilloin v. Walcott10 2
where the father neither exercised nor sought actual or legal
custody10 3 nor shouldered any significant responsibilities regarding the child's care or support.'°4
Two important distinctions as to the parental rights of
unwed fathers are being made by the Court. First, the Court
differentiates between unwed fathers who have participated
in raising the child and those who have not. Second, the
Court distinguishes situations involving newborn children
from those involving older children.
In Stanley and Caban state intervention deprived an unwed father of his children after he had established a familial
relationship with them and actually participated in their
rearing.10 5 However, in Quilloin the father had never lived
with the child nor attempted to legitimate or support him. 0 6
In all of the above cases the Court attempted to protect
an existing de facto familial relationship between parents
and child.10 7 In Stanley and Caban the Court extended con99. Id at 651.
100. Id at 389.
101. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
102. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
103. Id at 255, 256.
104. Id at 256.
105. In Stanley the father had lived with the mother intermittently for 18 years
and sired three children whom he helped raise. 450 U.S. at 646, 651. In Caban the
petitioner had lived with the children for years as well as helped raise them. 441 U.S.
at 389.
106. The Court noted that the unwed father had never lived with the mother,
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247, or the child, id at 253; had never attempted to legitimate
the child in the eleven years prior to the adoption petition, id at 249; and had never
shouldered any parental responsibilities, id at 246.
107. See supra note 105. In Quilloin the Court noted that the effect of the adoption order was to "give full recognition to a family unit already in existence." 434
U.S. at 255.
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stitutional protection to the rights of unwed fathers who had
assumed parental responsibilities similar to those of a legitimate parent. In Quilloin the Court refused to extend the
same rights to a father whose only relation to the child was

biological. 08

Distinctions based on the age of the child are not so
clear. The Court has not decided whether the parental rights
of unwed fathers of newborn infants are entitled to the same
constitutional protection as the rights of unwed fathers of
older children. Language in Caban, a case involving older
children, 0 9 implies that they may not be so entitled. The
Court suggested in dicta that in the case of newborns where
the father had not come forward to participate in parental

responsibilities, he might not be entitled to the full panoply
of constitutional protections.' 10
B.

Wisconsin Supreme Court

1. 1890-1949
Significant judicial discussion of Wisconsin's adoption
and termination proceedings began in the late nineteenth
century."' Since adoption proceedings were unknown at
common law," 12 many early Wisconsin decisions dealt with
the question of whether the trial court met the statutory pre3

requisites for jurisdiction to enter an adoption order."1

108. See supra note 105. The Court later noted in Caban that the father's claim
in Quilloin was rejected in part "for his failure to act as a father toward his children."
Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7.
109. The children were ages four and six at the time. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
110. After discussing the problems of illegitimate newborns the Court noted that
in those cases where the father never did come forward to participate in the child's
upbringing a state would not be precluded by the equal protection clause from withholding his privilege to veto the adoption of the child. Caban, 441 U.S. it 392. The
Court expressed no view, however, whether the special difficulties surrounding the
adoption of newborn children "would justify a statute addressed particularly to newborn [infants] adoptions, setting forth more stringent requirements concerning the acknowledgement of paternity or a stricter definition of abandonment." Id at 392 n. 11.
11. See In re Estate of McCormick, 108 Wis. 234, 84 N.W. 148 (1900); Parsons
v. Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147 (1898); Schiltz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 56 N.W.
194 (1893).
112. St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483, 206
N.W. 921 (1926).
113. See, e.g., Will of Bresnehan, 221 Wis. 51, 265 N.W. 93 (1936); St. Vincent's
Infant Asylum v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483, 206 N.W. 921 (1926); In re
Adoption of Bearby, 185 Wis. 33, 200 N.W. 686 (1924); Carlson v. MacCormick, 178
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Though the supreme court initially held that adoption statutes were to be liberally construed'1 4 and that mere irregularities of procedure would not be allowed to defeat the
purposes of such laws, the court required that the statutory
prerequisites of jurisdiction exist before a court could be authorized to act. " 5
The most important concern the Wisconsin Supreme
Court faced was the evaluation of the interests involved in
adoption proceedings." 6 During this period the court first
considered the interest of the child in adoption proceedings.
The court stated that "[t]he adoption statute. . . looks to the
interests of children primarily. That is its controlling idea
and policy. Therefore every reasonable intendment should
be indulged in, in case of doubt, in the line of promoting that
object.""117 Based on that policy, the court erased all doubt as
to the weight of the child's interest in early state adoption
proceedings, finding that "the controlling consideration 1is8
'
and should be the welfare and best interest of the child."
The court also weighed the child's interest in remaining
in a stable and secure environment. In what may be the earliest treatment by the Wisconsin Supreme Court of what
later became the concept of separation trauma, the court
held that:
In determining matters having to do with the custody of
children, the primary question is what is for the best interests of the child? Where a parent has voluntarily contracted away his rights, and the child as a result has formed
Wis. 408, 190 N.W. 108 (1922); Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis. 605, 87 N.W. 853 (1901);
cases cited supra note 111. One interesting sidelight is that many of the initial cases
involved collateral rather than direct attacks on the adoption discussed therein.
Bresnehan, In re Estate of McCormick and Glascotu were will contests brought by
parties disgruntled at the prospect of sharing the estate with an adoptee. Schiltz involved an action for alienation of affection.
114. Glascott v. Bragg, Ill Wis. 605, 610, 87 N.W. 853, 854 (1901); Parsons v.
Parsons, 101 Wis. 76, 80, 77 N.W. 147, 148 (1898).
115. In re Adoption of Bearby, 185 Wis. 33, 35, 200 N.W. 686, 687 (1924).
116. Other issues often raised involved questions of interpretation of the then
current adoption statutes. The court, for example, defined abandonment in Parsons
as "no more than neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of

care and support which parents owe to their children." Parsons v. Parsons, 101 Wis.
76, 79, 77 N.W. 147, 148 (1898).
117. Id at 80, 77 N.W. at 148.
118. In re Adoption of Jackson, 201 Wis. 642, 645, 231 N.W. 158, 159 (1930).
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new attachments, it may very well be that a situation has
been created which a court will hesitate to disturb, not on

the principal ground that the contract was valid or invalid,
but because, everything considered, the welfare of
the child
19
demands continuance of the new relationship.'

The rights of individuals other than those traditionally
involved in adoption proceedings were first considered by
the court in In re Adoption of Jackson. 2° In that case, the

maternal grandparents argued that, as grandparents, they
were the natural guardians of the child and were legally entitled to his custody. The court rejected the idea that blood
relatives have rights in such children and held that any
rights which may exist were subordinate to the best interests
of the child.
In perhaps the most important decision of the period,
Lacher v. Venus, 12' the court discussed the rights of parents
in adoption proceedings. Earlier, the court had described
parents' rights as the "most sacred natural rights."'' 22 In
Lacher the court recognized that natural parenthood gave
rise to substantial rights as well as responsibilities. 23 It con119. Stickles v. Reichard, 203 Wis. 579, 583, 234 N.W. 728, 730 (1931).
120. 201 Wis. 642, 231 N.W. 158 (1930). The case involved a dispute between the
maternal grandparents and a maternal aunt over the custody of a child whose parents
had died in an accident. Though both couples were found to be proper and suitable
to adopt the child, the court awarded the child to the maternal aunt.
121. 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
122. Schiltz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 40, 56 N.W. 194, 196 (1893).
123. Lacher, 177 Wis. at 570, 188 N.W. at 617. Describing the relationship between parent and child, the court stated:
The unit of the state is the individual, its foundation the family. To
protect the unit in his constitutionally guaranteed right to form and preserve
the family is one of the basic principles for which organized government is
established. I Cooley, Torts (3d ed.) 27.
That natural parenthood implies both substantial responsibilities and gives
substantial rights needs no discussion. That willful neglect to perform the one
may properly result in the forfeiture of the other is also not open to debate and
not here for consideration.
A natural affection between the parents and offspring, though it may be
naught but a refined animal instinct and stronger from the parent down than
from the child up, has always been recognized as an inherent, natural right, for
the protection of which, just as much as for the protection of the rights of the
individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, our government is
formed. We trust that it will never become the established doctrine that the
state shall say to the parents, and particularly to the mother, she who doth
travail, and in great pain bring forth her child and after labour doth rejoice
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cluded that these rights, even though "naught but a refined
animal instinct and stronger from the parent down than
from the child up,"' 24 deserved constitutional protections.
Based on the above, the court found itself favoring the natural rights of parents over the control and custody of their
children. This preference for parental rights influenced
sub125 and remains an influence. 126
decisions
sequent
2.

1950-1969

After almost a decade of inactivity, the court addressed a
number of new and controversial issues, including revocation of a consent to adopt and the status of unwed fathers.
In In re Adoption of Morrison 27 the court considered
whether a minor mother could revoke her voluntary consent
to terminate her rights prior to the adoption hearing. Pursuant to prebirth arrangements,' 28 the child was placed with
the adoptive parents six days after birth and remained there
until the time of trial. The minor mother later executed a
that the child is born, that there is but a mere privilege and not a right to the
subsequent affection, comfort, and pride of and in such child.
We have not overlooked those features in connection with the family relationship that savor of financial or property rights; the right to service, to earnings, to actions for damages against those who destroy or impair the ability to
serve, the natural as well as the statutory right to support from the child even
after its majority; the right to inheritance, all of which are certainly as much
entitled to the protection of the constitutional provision as to due process of
law as are those which merely affect the pocketbook....
The normal man and woman who have exercised their inherent right to
form the family relationship and have brought children into this world and
who have not by willful omission or commission on their part renunciated that
relationship, cannot and ought not to have such relationship destroyed, even
by attempted action in the name of the state, save and except through due
process of law.
Id at 569-70, 188 N.W. at 617-18.
124. Id at 569, 188 N.W. at 617.
125. In re Rice, 179 Wis. 531, 192 N.W. 56 (1923).
126. See, e.g., In re Adoption of R.P.R., 95 Wis. 2d 573, 581-83, 291 N.W.2d 591,
596-97 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980) (discussion of
Lacher).
127. 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W.2d 759 (1951), reh g denied, 260 Wis. 69a, 51 N.W.2d
713 (1952).
128. The adoptive parents agreed to, and did, pay the medical expenses for the
care of the minor mother from the last period of pregnancy until after the delivery of
the child. Id at 52-53, 49 N.W.2d at 760.
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voluntary written consent before the court, 12 9 and the adoptive parents petitioned for adoption. Prior to the adoption
hearing, the minor mother attempted to withdraw her consent, claiming that the consent had been the result of coercion and was neither freely nor voluntarily given.
On appeal the supreme court refused to allow the minor
mother to withdraw her freely given consent without cause.
This decision was based on several factors. First, the court
concluded that in cases most similar to Morrison, courts had
refused to allow withdrawal.' 30 Second, the court explained
that a contrary holding would contradict express statutory
language.' 3' Finally and most importantly, the court decided that the best interests of the child required a refusal. 132
In Morrison the court also considered the status of unwed fathers. 133 Shortly after coming of age, and after the
adoption proceedings had been commenced but prior to the
final decree, the mother married the father. Thus, at the
time of the adoption proceeding the child was legitimate
under the statute. 34 Consequently, the court had to decide
whether the consent of the father was necessary prior to the
adoption. 35 While recognizing the rights of a biological father, the court found that such rights must be subordinated
129. At the time she signed the consent, the minor mother was accompanied by
her mother, her brother and her attorney. Id at 53, 49 N.W.2d at 760-61.
130. Id at 60-63, 49 N.W.2d at 764-65 (citing In re Adoption of Minor, 144 F.2d
644 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N.E. 758 (1935)).
131. Morrison, 260 Wis. at 63, 49 N.W.2d at 765 ("The minority of a parent is not
ground for revoking consent." WIs. STAT. § 322.04(4) (1947)).
132. "The primary and paramount consideration in construing the adoption statutes is the welfare of the child and the so-called rights of the natural parents in such
child are subordinated thereto." Morrison, 260 Wis. at 59, 79 N.W.2d at 763.
133. The court again discussed the rights of unwed fathers in In re Aronson, 263
Wis. 604, 58 N.W.2d 553 (1953). InAronson the court found that the putative father,
together with parents and the person having custody at the commencement of the
proceedings, were proper parties to a juvenile proceeding and thus had the right to
appeal the final order transferring custody of the child in terminating parental rights.
However, the court also found that a putative father had no right to notice of such
proceedings because to require such notice might in some interests be inimical to the
best interests of the child, and the child's interests were paramount. Id at 616, 58
N.W.2d at 559.
134. See Wis. STAT. § 245.36 (1947).
135. Wis. STAT. § 322.04(l) (1947) expressly provided that the consent of the father of a child born out of marriage was not required for a valid adoption. Thus, the
issue became whether § 322.04(l) applied to the date the adoption action was commenced or the date the adoption order was entered.
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to the best interests of the child. In so doing, the court again
acknowledged the importance of psychological parenthood
and what was to become known as separation trauma:
If the proposed adoptive parents have instituted adoption proceedings upon reliance of the written consent of the
mother of an illegitimate to the adoption and the court has
assumed jurisdiction in such proceedings, and have taken
the child into their home for a substantial period of time so
that bonds of affection have developed between the child
and them, it could hardly be maintained that it would be in
the best interests of the child to disrupt all this and force
the removal of the child from the foster home because of
the subsequent marriage of the mother to the natural father
136
and the failure of the father to then give his consent.
A subsequent appeal involving the same parties illustrates an early tendency of the Wisconsin Legislature to pass
laws in reaction to judicial decisions in the area of adoption. 137 Shortly after the decision in Morrison, a bill was
prepared and introduced at the behest of the adoptive parents which, though introduced as a bill of general application, was particularly drafted to fit the status of the child
they wanted to adopt. When enacted into law, it effectively
allowed the adoptive parents to petition a court for an order
declaring the child to be theirs for all legal intents and purposes. 38 The adoptive parents followed the procedures set
136. Morrison, 260 Wis. at 64-65, 49 N.W.2d at 766. The Morrison court also
discussed the role of the guardian ad litem:
[T]he function of the guardian adlitem in adoption cases is not to counsel with
the mother at the time of her signing the consent, but rather. . he is to make
his own independent investigation thereafter as to whether the mother freely
and voluntarily executed such consent, and also as to whether the best interests
of the child would be promoted by him joining in such consent.
Id at 67-68, 49 N.W.2d at 767-68.
137. In re Adoption of Morrison, 267 Wis. 625, 66 N.W.2d 732 (1954).
138. Act of May 20, 1953, ch. 170, 1953 Wis. Laws 163 (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 322.04(9)(b) (1953)):
Whenever a petition shall be filed in any court showing that such court had
theretofore made an order for the adoption by the petitioners of an illegitimate
child of a minor mother, which order was invalid due to a failure to secure the
concurrence in consent required by this subsection, the court shall appoint a
time and place for hearing the petition and due notice of such hearing shall be
given to the mother of such child in the manner provided in § 324.18. If upon
such hearing it shall appear that the illegitimate child was placed for adoption
and continued to remain for more than 5 years in the custody of the petitioners, that the mother was, at the time of giving her consent, represented by a
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forth and the trial court ordered the adoption. The supreme
court subsequently upheld this order and the constitutionality of the statute in the second In re Adoption of Morrison

case. 139
During this period the court decided three cases dealing
with the consent of institutional guardians in adoptions
where the State Department of Public Welfare was the
child's guardian. In In re Adoption of Tschudy"o the court
held that a court lacked jurisdiction to order the adoption of
a child in the legal guardianship of the Department without
its consent. Shortly after Tschudy, the legislature passed reactive legislation eliminating the absolute veto power of such
a guardian over an adoption.1 4 ' In In re Adoption of
Brown 142 and In re Adoption of Shields'43 the court interpreted the new statute to mean that before it could waive the
requirement of the guardian's consent, the trial court must
find either that the refusal is not based on a bona fide belief
that it is in the best interest of the child or that the guardian
duly licensed attorney, and that the prior order of adoption was invalid solely
because of a failure to secure concurrence in consent required by this subsection, the court shall enter an order declaring that the child shall be to all legal
intents and purposes the child of the petitioners from and after the date of such
subsequent order.
139. 267 Wis. 625, 66 N.W.2d 732 (1954).
140. 267 Wis. 272, 65 N.W.2d 17 (1954). Wis. STAT. § 322.04(2) (1953) expressly
required the consent of the Department to the adoption of a child in the legal guardianship of the Department. Citing Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613
(1922), the court found that because adoption proceedings are statutory, the essential
statutory requirements must be complied with for a court to have jurisdiction to order
an adoption. Tschudy, 267 Wis. at 284, 65 N.W.2d at 22.
141. Act of Aug. 20, 1955, ch. 575, § 7, 1955 Wis. Laws 719, 748 created a provision allowing a trial court to review a refusal of consent:
If a guardian whose consent is required by § 48.84(l)(c) refuses to consent, he
shall file with the court a summary of his reasons for withholding consent.
After a study of this report, the court may dismiss the petition on the ground
that the guardian refuses to consent or may set a time and place for a hearing
to determine whether the guardian's refusal to consent is contrary to the best
interests of the child. At least 10 days notice in writing of the hearing shall be
given to both the petitioner and the guardian refusing to consent. If the court,
after the hearing, determines that the guardian's refusal to consent is arbitrary,
capricious or not based on substantial evidence, it may waive the requirement
of such consent and proceed to determine the petition for adoption in accordance with the best interests of the child.
It was codified at Wis. STAT. § 48.85 (1955).
142. 5 Wis. 2d 428, 92 N.W.2d 749 (1958).
143. 4 Wis. 2d 219, 89 N.W.2d 827 (1958).
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has no reasonable factual basis for believing that the adop-

tion is not in the child's best interest.

44

During the 1960's, the court's influence in this area was

primarily indirect through several decisions regarding the
status, under state testamentary or intestacy laws, of a person
who had been the subject of adoption proceedings.145 These
decisions raised few146novel legal issues in the termination or

adoption law area.
3. 1970-1979

Significant developments in the area of adoption and ter-

mination occurred after 1970. Generally, three major issues
were faced by the court. First, the court considered the effect
of termination or adoption proceedings on the interests or
rights of parties other than the three traditionally involved in
adoption proceedings. Second, the court reviewed the rights

of a child who is the subject of a termination or adoption
proceeding. In particular, the court during this period examined the nature of the "best interests" doctrine, the rights
of the child and the weight of those rights in relation to potential conflicts with parental rights. The court also for the

first time provided an in-depth analysis of separation
trauma. Third, in a series of significant cases, all denomi144. In Shields, 4 Wis. 2d at 224, 89 N.W.2d at 830, the court stated:
In the light of this legislative history, we construe § 48.85, Stats., as authorizing the county court to dispense with the guardian's consent to adoption only
where the evidence taken at the required hearing discloses either (1) that the
guardian's refusal to consent is not based on a bona fide belief that such is for
the best interests of the child, or (2) that the guardian has no reasonable basis
in fact for believing that the proposed adoption would be contrary to the
child's best interests. In either of those cases the refusal of consent would be
arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence. On the other hand,
the court is not authorized to waive guardian's consent merely because it disagrees with the guardian's appraisal of the facts and, substituting its judgment
for that of the guardian, considers that the proposed adoption will best serve
the interests of the child.
The court heavily relied on Shields in Brown, 5 Wis. 2d at 436-39, 92 N.W.2d at 753.
145. See, e.g., Nelson v. City Bank, 42 Wis. 2d 390, 166 N.W.2d 251 (1969); Tennessen v. Topel, 32 Wis. 2d 223, 145 N.W.2d 162 (1966); Smith v. Reinhart, 30 Wis.
2d 250, 140 N.W.2d 219 (1966); Roth v. Filipek, 25 Wis. 2d 528, 131 N.W.2d 286
(1964).
146. In Tennessen v. TYopel the court did address the issue of whether the failure
to appoint a guardian ad litem in an adoption proceeding was a jurisdictional defect.
The court found that it was not. 32 Wis. 2d at 229-30, 145 N.W.2d at 165.
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nated State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services,147 the
court dealt with the rights of an unwed father in termination
proceedings.
a. Interests of otherparties
In Estate of Pamanet41 1 the biological siblings of the decedent contested the inheritance rights of birth parents
whose rights to the decedent had been terminated. The
court held that the termination of parental rights completely
severed the legal relationship between the parent and child,
and destroyed all rights of the parent to the child, including
those of inheritance.149 Interestingly, the court held that as a
result of the termination proceeding the decedent's biological brothers and sisters, not the parents whose rights as parents had been terminated, were the decedent's heirs at law. 50
InIn re Z15' foster parents petitioned the court for review
of an administrative decision which ordered removal of children from their foster home for adoptive placement. Although the court recognized that foster parents had some
rights regarding children in their custody and care which
had been conferred on them by the Children's Code, the
court held that such rights must bow to the rights of the child
52
as expressed by the best interests doctrine.
Another major issue faced by the court during this period
was whether the doctrine of parental rights, as enunciated by
147. 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 643 (1975); 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973);
47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated and remandedsub nom. Rothstein v.
Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
148. 46 Wis. 2d 514, 175 N.W.2d 234 (1970), reh g granted, 46 Wis. 2d 518, 177
N.W.2d 105 (1970).
149. Id at 516, 175 N.W.2d at 236.
150. Id at 518, 175 N.W.2d at 236-37. On rehearing, the court noted that only
those biological siblings who had themselves been adopted by other parties no longer
had the right to inherit from the decedent sibling. The court thus implicitly noted that
it is not the termination which destroys the rights of biological siblings, but an order
of adoption. Therefore, the rights of biological siblings to inherit from and through
each other remains legally cognizable until such time as an adoption order places the
child in an entirely new family unit. 46 Wis. 2d at 518-19, 177 N.W.2d at 105.
151. 81 Wis. 2d 194, 260 N.W.2d 246 (1977).
152. Id at 203, 260 N.W.2d at 250-51. Though the court recognized some rights
of foster parents, it reasoned that the legislature had mandated that in those instances
where the interests of the child conflict with the interests of the parent or guardian,
such conflicts are clearly to be resolved, not in favor of the parent or guardian, but in
favor of the interests of the child. Id
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the court, extended to relatives of the biological parent. In
both In re Adoption of Tachick 51 3 and In re Adoption of Randolph 15 4 grandparents had petitioned for adoption. In
Tachick the children had lived with the grandparents all of
their lives, while in Randolph the children had been placed
with a cousin of one of the natural parents after both parents' accidental death and had become assimilated into the
cousin's family. In Tachick the court reversed the trial court
and ordered that the grandparents' petition for adoption be
granted. The Randolph court, on the other hand, affirmed
the denial of the petition for adoption. In both cases the
guardian ad litem had recommended against adoption.
The question of whether relatives other than biological
parents possess "some right" or interest derived from the biological parents was not directly addressed in Tachick. Yet
the Tachick court appeared to recognize this right in finding
that "it is significant that the petitioners are the grandparents
of the child and have taken care of him since birth."' 55 In
Randolph the grandparents claimed that the trial court's denial of adoption contravened the legal rights of grandparents
"who stand in the legal shoes of the deceased parent and
have the right to the award of the adoption in the absence of
a finding that they are unfit."' 15 6 The court rejected this argument, noting that there was no authority for the proposition that in an adoption proceeding the grandparents
succeeded 57to whatever rights the biological parents may
have had.
153. 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
154. 68 Wis. 2d 64, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975).
155. Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d at 549, 210 N.W.2d at 869. It should be also noted that
this clause served to again support the concepts of psychological parenthood and separation trauma.
156. Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d at 67, 227 N.W.2d at 636.

157. The decision was based in part on the court's belief that the provision in the
juvenile code requiring a parent to consent to an adoption contained no provision
requiring such consent from a grandparent. The court also noted that a similar contention had been rejected in In re Adoption of Jackson, 201 Wis. 642, 231 N.W. 158

(1930). Finally, the court implicitly recognized that even had such rights existed, they
would be subordinate to the best interests of the child. Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d at 68,
227 N.W.2d at 636-37.
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b. Rights of the child
Throughout this period the court reviewed in greater
depth the rights of the child. First, the court attempted to
further define what was meant by the "best interests of the
child." Second, the court formulated a method for weighing
those interests in competition with the rights of other parties
in adoption proceedings. Third, the court considered the
weight to be given to the factor of separation trauma and the
child's right to a stable and secure environment.
The best interests concept is indeed an amorphous one.
This is borne out by three positions the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has taken. Language in early cases gave rise to the
view that a determination of the best interests of the child
was solely a question of fact. 58 This view was repudiated in
Tachick 59 when the court found that such a determination
was a question of law, reviewable de novo by the supreme
court.
In Randolph the court stepped back from this definition,
holding that a determination of the best interests of the child
by the trial court was a "mixed question of facts and law."' 60
The court stated that a determination of the best interests of
the child was a question of fact "in the sense that precise
determinations must be made about specific factors such as
age, finances of the parties, discipline questions, and psychological factors."' 16' On the other hand, the "application of
the correct standards for determining the best interests of the
child and the ultimate conclusion of where the best interests
of the children lie is a matter for legal determination
by the
' 62
trial court, reviewable as such on appeal."'
The court has also discussed the conflict between the
rights of the child and the rights of other parties. Section
158. In re Adoption of Jackson, 201 Wis. 642, 645, 231 N.W. 158, 159 (1930).
159. In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 549,210 N.W.2d 865, 869 (1973).
160. In re Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d 64, 69,227 N.W.2d 634, 637 (1975).
161. Id
162. Id Adoption and termination cases appear to be given almost unique treatment by courts of appeal. Appeals in these areas appear to place a greater interest
than usual on examining the facts first, and the law second, in reaching a decision.
This may account for the high number of appellate reversals and for the frequency
with which recommendations of the guardians ad litem are overridden.
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48.01163 of the Wisconsin Statutes established that the interests of the child are paramount.' The court has repeatedly
recognized that where a conflict exists, it must be resolved in
favor of the child. 65 The child's best interests, the court has
166
determined, are superior to the interests of foster parents,

prospective
adoptive parents' 67 and other relatives of the
1 68
child.

The interest of the child given the most attention by the
court was the child's interest in remaining in a stable environment. In three cases decided during this period, the court
focused its attention on the factor of the psychological
trauma attendant upon disturbing the continuity of a child's

environment.

69

The court appeared to give great weight to

the factor of separation trauma when the child had been
placed prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings. 170 In
Tachick the court reversed the trial court's denial of a petition for adoption by the grandparents of the children in part
because of its opinion that the trial court had given too little
weight to the separation trauma factor.17 1 In In re Termina163. The intent of chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes is to promote the best
interests of the child; the best interests of the child are paramount. Wis. STAT.
§ 48.01(2) (1979).
164. See, e.g., In re Z, 81 Wis. 2d 194, 203, 260 N.W.2d 246 (1977).
165. Id at 203, 260 N.W.2d at 251;In re Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d at 69,
227 N.W.2d at 636-37. See also In re Termination of Parental Rights to Kegel, 85
Wis. 2d at 583-84, 271 N.W.2d at 118; In re Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d at 54748, 210 N.W.2d at 868-69, citing Wis. STAT. § 48.01 (1973).
166. In re Z, 81 Wis. 2d 194, 260 N.W.2d 246 (1977).
167. Cf. In re Adoption of Shawn, 65 Wis. 2d 190, 222 N.W.2d 139 (1974).
168. In re Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d 64, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975); In re
Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
169. In re Termination of Parental Rights to Kegel, 85 Wis. 2d 574, 271 N.W.2d
114 (1978); In re Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d 64, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975); In re
Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
170. The importance the supreme court gave to the factor of separation trauma in
large part explains the contradictory results in Randolph and Tachick. In both cases
grandparents of the children involved had attempted to adopt them. The situations of
the grandparents in both instances were remarkably similar. The chief and perhaps
only difference between the two situations was that in Randolph the children in question had been placed with a third party and had effectively become part of the home,
whereas in Tachick the children had lived almost their entire lives with the grandparents. It appears, therefore, that in Tachick the court was in effect giving legal recognition to an already formed family, whereas in Randolph the court would in effect be
destroying that family and removing the children from a stable environment to place
them with the grandparents.
171. Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d at 556, 210 N.W.2d at 873.
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tion of ParentalRights to Kegel172 the court held that, since
the children involved had spent the vast majority of their
lives in the care of their grandparents and the grandparents
had provided the only stability in the lives of the children,
the children's need for a stable environment outweighed the
interests of the birth mother in the termination proceedings. 73 Although the grandparents' situation in Randolph
was strikingly similar to the position of the grandparents in
Tachick, the Randolph court refused to award adoptive custody to the grandparents, in large part because the children
74
had become part of the family with which they resided.
c. Treatment ofparentalrights
The Wisconsin Supreme Court faced the issue of the
rights of unwed fathers in termination proceedings in a series of cases all titled State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social
Services. 75 Originally the biological mother had petitioned
the court for a termination of her parental rights to facilitate
the child's placement for adoption. The birth father had not
been given notice of the termination hearing and had consented to neither the termination of his parental rights nor
the appointment of Lutheran Social Services as the guardian
of the child. 176 Approximately four months after the termination hearing, the putative father petitioned the court for a
writ of habeas corpus asking the court to vacate the termination and adoptive placement order and grant him a hearing
172. 85 Wis. 2d 574, 585, 271 N.W.2d 114, 119 (1978).
173. Id at 585, 271 N.W.2d at 119.
174. Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d at 70-72, 227 N.W.2d at 641.
175. State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services actually involved three sepa-

rate cases. The first was State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420,
178 N.W.2d 56 (1970) (Lewis 1). This case was later returned to the Wisconsin appellate courts by the decision of the United States Supreme Court to vacate and remand
the decision in Lewis I in Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
The court considered the issues raised on remand in State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran
Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973) (Lewis11), where the court in turn
remanded the case to the trial court for certain additional evidentiary findings. The
additional findings of the trial court were again appealed to the supreme court in
State ex re. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975)
(Lewis II1).
176. The statutes did not require that such notice be given to an unwed father.
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regarding his right to the care, custody and control of his
illegitimate child.'77
In Lewis 118 the court focused primarily on the rights of
an unwed father in a termination proceeding. On appeal,
the biological father contended that all unwed fathers have
parental rights which include the right to notice of a hearing
prior to termination of parental rights. 179 While recognizing
that an unwed father possessed some rights at common law,
the court held that any rights he may have enjoyed were abrogated by the Children's Code.8 0
The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court at approximately the same time the Court was deciding Stanley v. Illinois.'8 ' After deciding Stanley, the Court in
,Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services 8 2 vacated the decision
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and remanded it "for further consideration in light of Stanley. . .with due consideration for the completion of adoption procedings and the fact
that the child has apparently lived with
the adoptive family
183
for the intervening period of time."'
These issues were addressed in Lewis 11.184 In a majority
opinion written by Chief Justice Hallows, the lone dissenter
177. Lewis 1,47 Wis. 2d at 421-22, 178 N.W.2d at 56-57.
178. 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970). See supra note 175.
179. Id at 422-23, 178 N.W.2d at 57.
180. In addition, the court found that the rights of an illegitimate father, though
recognized, do not rise to the status of "parental rights" and therefore any failure to
grant parental rights or notice of hearing did not violate the state or federal constitution. Id at 434, 178 N.W.2d at 63.
In addition to the majority opinion, concurring and dissenting opinions were filed.
In the dissent Chief Justice Hallows contended that an unwed father should have
parental rights and that such rights could not be terminated absent his consent or a
hearing and for good cause. Id at 437-38, 178 N.W.2d at 65-67. Chief Justice Hallows' basis for this right rested in part on what he believed to be the rights of the
illegitimate child to a family and a father. Id at 438-40, 178 N.W.2d at 65-66. Even
Chief Justice Hallows, however, implicitly admitted that at any required hearing, the
putative father should have to prove his competency and suitability to care for the
child as part of the issue of whether his parental rights should be terminated. Id at
442, 178 N.W.2d at 67.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Robert Hansen stated that unwed fathers should
not be accorded full parental rights because the legal concept of fatherhood involves
more than a mere biological relationship. Id at 435-37, 178 N.W.2d at 63-65.
181. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
182. 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
183. Id at 1051.
184. 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973). See supra note 175.
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in Lewis 1,185 the court held that under Stanley, the denial of
the existence of parental rights in an unwed father was unconstitutional. The court believed that Stanley mandated
that the adoption of an illegitimate child required either the
consent or the termination of the right of both unwed par-

ents or the consent of one parent accompanied
by the proper
86

termination of the rights of the other.1
Analysis of the majority opinion raises several questions,
some of which were raised in the dissent. 8 7 The first concerns the proper application of Stanley. The majority opinion required either the termination of the parental rights or
the consent of an unwed father prior to the adoption of his
children. The majority, while holding Stanley to require this
position, provided no reference to confirming language in
that decision. In addition, the majority opinion appeared to
ignore critical distinctions between Stanley and Lewis.188
For example, while the majority opinion noted that Mr.
Stanley had lived for eighteen years with the mother and the
children, consideration of this factor was deemed unimportant in distinguishing Stanley from the facts in Lewis. 89 The
fact that Mr. Stanley had custody and had lived in a parental
relationship with the children was critical to the United
States Supreme Court.' 90
Moreover, the majority opinion apparently disregarded
the directions of the United States Supreme Court in Rothstein. The Rothstein Court required that the case be remanded "with due consideration for the completion of
adoption proceedings and the fact that the child has appar185. See supra note 180.
186. Lewis II, 59 Wis. 2d at 8-9, 207 N.W.2d at 830.
187. Justice Robert Hansen, who concurred in Lewis I, wrote a dissenting opinion in Lewis II.
188. The dissent points out that there are important distinctions between Stanley
and Lewis which rendered the Stanley decision inapplicable to a "Lewis" setting.
Most important of these was the fact that Mr. Stanley had lived in a familial relationship with the mother of the children and the children themselves. Therefore, the action taken in Stanley involved the destruction of an existing family unit. The home of
the father was the only home the three children had ever known. Mr. Stanley had
never denied the fact of his paternity nor had he ever refused to accept the responsibilities thereof. These facts distinguish Stanley from the situation involved in Lewis.
See 59 Wis. 2d at 14-17, 207 N.W.2d at 833-36 (Hansen, R., J., dissenting).
189. Lewis II, 59 Wis. 2d at 4, 207 N.W.2d at 828.
190. Id at 14, 207 N.W.2d at 833 (R. Hansen, J.,
dissenting).
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ently lived with the adoptive family for the intervening period of time."' 9 ' Although specifically acknowledging this
instruction, 92 the majority, as pointed out by the9 3dissent, nowhere addressed the issues raised in Rothstein
The unwed father appealed for the final time to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lewis II . 194 The court concluded

that
the father had in fact abandoned the child and that termination
of the rights of both biological parents was in the
child's best interest. In so doing, the court appeared to re-

verse its position in Lewis II which subordinated the child's
best interests to those of parents in termination
proceedings.

95

d Use of custody cases in terminationproceedings
In Lewis II and several more recent cases 196 the court
relied on language from custody determination cases to bolster decisions made in termination proceedings. Three important nontermination custody cases were decided in this
period. 197 Issues similar to those faced in termination pro191. Rothstein, 405 U.S. at 1051.
192. Lewis II, 59 Wis. 2d at 3, 207 N.W.2d at 828.
193. Id at 17-20, 207 N.W.2d at 833 (Hansen, R., J., dissenting).
194. 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975). In Lewis I the court remanded the
case to a referee to determine whether the alleged father was in fact the father of the
child in question and, if so, whether he was fit to have or should have custody. The
referee found the alleged father to be the father of the child in question. The court
also vacated the adoption decision and remanded with a direction to hold a termination hearing. On remand the trial court terminated the rights of the unwed father on
the grounds of abandonment. See id at 37-38, 227 N.W.2d at 644-45.
195. In Lewis II Chief Justice Hallows attempted to resolve the apparent conflict
between the natural rights of the parent and the best interests of the child test by
noting that in Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972), the court
found that the best interests were not a controlling factor. The majority opinion did,
however, note that a decision on where the best interests of a child lie in an adoption
or termination proceeding would be inappropriate for decision at that time. Lewis I1,
59 Wis. 2d at 9-10, 207 N.W.2d at 831. In Lewis 1II, however, the court specifically
noted that determinations under Wis. STAT. ch. 48 (1973) are to be made giving paramount consideration to the best interests of the child. Lewis 111, 68 Wis. 2d at 41, 227
N.W.2d at 647. The court's sole analysis under Lewis III was that the termination of
the parental rights of both biological parents was in the child's best interests. Id at
41-42, 227 N.W.2d at 647.
196. See, e.g., In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981); In re Termination of Parental Rights to A.M.K., 105 Wis. 2d 91,312 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1981);
In re Adoption of R.P.R., 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 98 Wis.
2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980).
197. LaChapell v. Mahwinney, 66 Wis. 2d 679, 225 N.W.2d 501 (1979); deMontigny v. deMontigny, 70 Wis. 2d 131, 233 N.W.2d 463 (1975); Ponsford v. Crute, 56
Wis. 2d 407. 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972).
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ceedings were raised and these decisions, though based on
factors not at all similar to those faced in termination proceedings,1 98 were to be an important influence on the court's
thinking in the latter area.
The major influence was the court's subordination of the
child's best interests to parental rights. The court held that
as between a natural father and third parties, the father cannot be deprived of custody unless unfit. 199 The court also
held that as a general matter, though not invariably, a child's
best interests will be served by living with his parents.2c° It is
only after this latter presumption is overcome that the best
20 1
interests of the child prevail over parental custody rights.
4.

1980-1982

The Wisconsin court has recently been faced with increasing numbers of disputes arising out of adoption or termination proceedings. In two of these matters, the interests
of the biological parents in termination or adoption proceedings were at issue, 20 2 while in two others, the interest of the
20 3
child was the focus.

In re Termination of ParentalRights to TR.M 2 0 involved an action by the natural mother to terminate the
rights of the unwed father. The supreme court reversed an
order terminating the birth father's parental rights. It found
198. In Ponsford, for example, the court's imposition of the requirement that a
natural parent be found unfit before being deprived of the custody of his minor children was based on the court's construction of Wis. STAT. § 247.24 (1971) (now
§ 767.24). Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 413, 202 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1972). That
statute specifically noted that the court can give the care and custody of the child to a
relative only "if the court finds either that the parents are unable to adequately care
for any such child or are not fit and proper persons to have the care and custody
thereof." No such requirement is established in Wis. STAT. ch. 48 (1981-1982).
199. Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 413, 202 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1972).
200. LaChapell, 66 Wis. 2d 679, 683, 225 N.W.2d 501, 503 (1979).
201. Id at 683-84, 225 N.W.2d at 503.
202. In re Termination of Parental Rights to A.M.K., 105 Wis. 2d 91, 312
N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1981); In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981).
203. In re Termination of Parental Rights to T.R.M., 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303
N.W.2d 581 (1981); In re Adoption of R.P.R., 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct.
App.), rev'd, 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980).
204. 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981), rev'g and remanding 95 Wis. 2d
736, 291 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1980).
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that the trial court's factual finding had merely repeated the
language of the termination statute and as such was inadequate to protect the rights of the litigants and facilitate re-

view of the record by an appellate court.0

More

importantly, the court in TkM. found that the trial court's
finding lacked a specific and formal determination regarding
the best interests of the child. 0 6 A trial court, the court de-

cided, is under an obligation in termination proceedings to
make findings with regard to the best interests of the child in
relation to the evidence adduced at trial. Failure to make
this formal finding required reversal and remand for com-

pletion of the record.20 7

In re Adoption ofR.P.. 208 involved a consent to adopt
procedure no longer allowed under current Wisconsin statutes. 20 9 The court of appeals noted that, in adoption proceed-

ings, the issue is really not the fitness of parents but the best
interests of the child. 1 ° While accepting the proposition that
the interests of a parent or parents are not irrelevant, the
court concluded that the child's interests must control. 21 ' In
addition, the court rejected that part of the parental rights

doctrine which was based on the common-law property right
of natural parents to their offspring, holding that such a concept is inconsistent with the modem day concept of the best
interests of the child.212 The court reiterated the position
205. Id at 687, 303 N.W.2d at 583.
206. Id
207. Id However, the court did note that the rights of the parent were also affected by the lack of an adequate record. It noted that filial relationships were basic
to our social structure and in the absence of a factual basis for legal interference with
the family, social bonds between parents and child should not be disturbed. Consequently, the court found that since the effect of a termination order represents a drastic interference with the fundamental rights of a parent, the rights of a parent must be
accorded a high order of respect and considered paramount until circumstances show
that a parent has forfeited these rights. Id at 688-89, 303 N.W.2d at 584.
208. 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297
N.W.2d 833 (1980).
209. Wis. STAT. § 48.84 (1979) was repealed by Act of Nov. 27, 1981, ch. 81, § 13,
1981 Wis. Laws 726, 733.
210. In re Adoption of R.P.R., 95 Wis. 2d at 577-78, 577 n.1, 291 N.W.2d at 59394, 594 n.1.
211. Id The court went on to distinguish custody cases from termination cases,
noting that the controlling factor for ending parental custody is not the best interests
of the child but parental fitness or unfitness. Id at 582, 291 N.W.2d at 596.
212. Id at 583, 291 N.W.2d at 596.
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that the primary consideration in construing adoption statutes is the welfare of the child and the so-called rights of the
natural parents are subordinate thereto. 1 3 While blood ties
are not irrelevant, they do not, under Wisconsin law, rise to
the stature of a presumption. 1 4 The principles enunciated
by the court of appeals appear to remain the law in
Wisconsin. 5
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals, 216 confirming the higher court's recent position that
the best interests of the child doctrine is a mixed question of
law and fact.2 7 The court held that the trial court's findings
were not against the great weight and clear preponderance of
the evidence, thus reinstating the trial court's holding allowing the withdrawal of consent by the natural mother. 21 8
2 9 the
In In re Termination of ParentalRights to A .MK
court of appeals was presented with several constitutional is213. Id at 585, 291 N.W.2d at 597.
214. Id at 586, 291 N.W.2d at 598.

215. Though the decision of the court of appeals was reversed by the supreme
court, the supreme court's reversal was based on narrow grounds. The decision of the
court of appeals is based on two factors. One was that the trial court had improperly
raised a presumption in favor of the natural parents. Id at 579, 291 N.W.2d at 594.
In so doing, the court of appeals held that there is no presumption in favor of a
biological parent in an adoption proceeding. This conclusion was affirmed by the
supreme court in its opinion. The supreme court, while differing on the issue, did not
differ on the law. The court held that the trial court did not apply a presumption in
favor of the natural mother. It only considered natural parental ties as one factor in
determining the best interests of the child. In re Adoption of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d at
622, 297 N.W.2d at 837-38. In addition, the court of appeals decision was predicated
on what it felt to be the improper use of expert testimony. The supreme court also
reversed on this issue. There was no reversal on the best interests issue, nor did there
need to be.
216. In re Adoption of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980), rev'g 95
Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1980). However, it should be noted that the
supreme court's decision left intact certain legal principles expressed in the court of
appeals' discussion of the best interests doctrine. See supra note 215.
217. In re Adoption of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d at 618, 297 N.W.2d at 836. The court
held that when there is a mixed question of law and fact, factual determinations will
not be reversed unless against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Id at 618-19, 297 N.W.2d at 836 (quoting Zapuchalak v. Hueal, 82 Wis. 2d
184, 192, 262 N.W.2d 514, 518 (1978)).
218. In re Adoption of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d at 623, 297 N.W.2d at 836. The court
also disagreed with the holding of the court of appeals that the trial court had applied
a presumption in favor of the natural mother, finding that the trial court had properly
found that blood ties were merely a factor to be considered.
219. 105 Wis. 2d 91, 312 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1981).
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sues involving parental fights within termination proceedings. 22° The two most important questions involved the
biological parent's attack on the burden of proof and the relationship of the least restrictive alternative philosophy of
the Children's Code with the standard of parental unfitness.

Proof of the factors influencing termination must be by
clear and convincing evidence. 22 1 The birth father argued

that the application of such a standard in termination pro-

ceedings violated, among other things, 222 his right to due

process. In rejecting this contention, the court analyzed the
right of the parent involved. The court recognized that

while not absolute, the right to establish a home and raise
children without governmental interference was a basic right
with which the state may not interfere absent a compelling

reason for doing

So.

2 23

However, as fundamental as this in-

terest is, it is not the only interest involved in the proceeding.
Other interests include those of the parent, child and state,

which may or may not conflict within a particular termination proceeding. 224 Based on a balancing of the interests involved, the court concluded that a clear and convincing

burden of proof was constitutionally correct.225

The court also noted that to fully protect parents' funda-

mental rights in termination cases, two conclusions must be
drawn by the trial court from sufficient evidence: (1) that the
220. One of the constitutional issues involved an attack on vagueness grounds on
a statute which has since been repealed. Id at 97-101, 312 N.W.2d at 844-45. The
discussion of this is therefore unnecessary to the present article.
221. Wis. STAT. § 48.31(1) (1981-1982).
222. The birth father made two arguments in regard to his attack on the burden
of proof. One of these was that the clear and convincing standard of proof violated
his constitutional right to equal protection under the 14th amendment because other
chapter 48 proceedings required a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt (e.g., prior
to a finding of delinquency under Wis. STAT. § 48.12 (1979)). A.M.K., 105 Wis. 2d at
103-04, 312 N.W.2d at 846-47. The court treated this issue rather summarily, holding
that the burden of proof treated parents faced with involuntary termination as a unified group subject to a single standard and so the fact that parents subject to termination were subject to a different standard than those in other situations was irrelevant
to the proceedings. Id at 104, 312 N.W.2d at 847.
223. A.M.K, 105 Wis. 2d at 105-06, 312 N.W.2d at 847. The court also acknowledged that the judicial power to terminate this right is an awesome one which may be
viewed as a sanction more severe than imprisonment. Id at 106-07, 312 N.W.2d at
847-48.
224. Id at 109, 312 N.W.2d at 849.
225. Id at 110, 312 N.W.2d at 849.
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termination proceeding is in the best interests of the child
the biological
and (2) that the parent is unfit.226 In .MK.
father argued that before terminating parental rights the
court must consider and reject less drastic alternatives. The
court rejected this contention, concluding that the examination of alternative remedies is implicit in a finding of unfitness. 227 In so holding, the court also established the standard
for finding unfitness in termination proceedings:
To support a finding of unfitness, "it must appear that the
[parent] has 'so conducted himself, or shown himself to be
a person of such description, or is placed in such a position,
as to render it not merely better for the children, but essential to their safety or to their welfare, in some serious and
important respect, that his rights should be treated as lost
or suspended,-should be superseded or interfered
with.' "228
Perhaps the most important case to be decided during
this period was In re JL.W 229 The court in .L.W. overturned an order terminating an unwed mother's parental
rights on the ground that the lower court had not made a
specific finding that she was unfit, even though a finding of
unfitness was not required under either Wisconsin statutes or
case law at the time. The court's decision to require such a
finding was based on constitutional considerations. The
opinion noted that the integrity of the family was subject to
constitutional protection.23 ° While this protection did not
preclude some state control over parental discretion in dealing with children when the child's physical or mental health
may be in jeopardy, it did require recognition that a parent's
interest in the custody of a child was cognizable and
substantial.23 '
The court also attempted to determine the effect of the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Qilloin v. Walcott.232 The court distinguished Quilloin because
226. Id at 110-11, 312 N.W.2d at 850.
227. Id at 101, 312 N.W.2d at 845.
228. Id at 102, 312 N.W.2d at 846 (quoting Lemmin v. Lorfeld, 107 Wis. 264,
266, 83 N.W. 359, 360 (1900) (emphasis deleted)).
229. 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981).
230. Id at 132, 306 N.W.2d at 53.
231. Id at 133, 306 N.W.2d at 53.
232. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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the child in JL.W. had been part of an existing family unit
with his biological mother.233 The court thereupon held that,
except in circumstances like those presented in Quilloin, the
due process protections of the state and federal constitutions
prohibited termination of a natural parent's rights unless the
234
parent was unfit.
The impact of JL.W. on the termination process raises
several questions, the primary one being whether a finding
of unfitness is required in all termination proceedings. Analysis of JL.W. indicates that the court did not go this far.
The court's requirement of unfitness in JL W. rests in large
part on its analysis of Stanley and Quilloin. The distinction
between the two is critical. In both cases the birth parent
whose rights were in jeopardy was an unwed parent. While
in Stanley the unwed father had lived in an existing family
unit with the child, in Quilloin the father had had no familial
relationship with the child. The court in JL W. recognized
this distinction, reiterating the serious constitutional reservations raised "if a state were to attempt to force the breakup of
a naturalfamily over the objections of parents and children
without some showing of unfitness . . .". Since the birth
parent had legal and physical custody of the child during the
majority of the child's first four months of life and the child's
existing "family unit" included the birth parent, the court
concluded that a finding of fitness was necessary. 236 Thus, it
could be inferred that where these or similar factors were not
present, a birth parent's rights could be terminated without a
finding of unfitness.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TERMINATION AND
ADOPTION PROCESS

A.

Early Adoption Legislation: 1890-1952

As noted previously, the adoption or termination process
was an entirely statutory one. Under early Wisconsin legis233. In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 135, 306 N.W.2d at 54.
234. Id at 136, 306 N.W.2d at 55.
235. Id at 134, 306 N.W.2d at 54 (quoting Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978) (emphasis added)).
236. Id at 135, 306 N.W.2d at 54.
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lation passed in the nineteenth century, 237 an adoption without the consent of the biological parent could only be
accomplished upon a finding that one or both of the parents
'238
had "abandoned the child or gone to parts unknown.
Legislative limitation of the bases for termination was based
on the long-standing view of children as the property of their
parents. The parents had an absolute right to their children
unless they voluntarily relinquished that right, either by
written consent or by abandonment.239
The Wisconsin court added grounds of abuse or neglect
to the single statutory ground of abandonment. 240 These
were later incorporated into the adoption statutes.24 ' Section
48.07(7) of the 1933 Wisconsin Statutes further expanded the
grounds for termination of parental rights to include: (1) If a
custodian (other than a parent) was not fitted for care, custody and control of the child; (2) If the biological parents
abandoned the child; (3) If the biological parents substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or being
financially able have neglected to give such child parental
care and protection.242
The grounds of abandonment and neglect gave courts
relatively broad discretion on the question of termination of
parental rights. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court required notice to birth parents before a finding of abandonment could be made, the then existing statute did not require
237. Under early Wisconsin law, proceedings to terminate parental rights and
proceedings to adopt a minor took place under different chapters of the Wisconsin
statutes. Termination proceedings were governed by WIs. STAT. ch. 48. See, e.g.,
Wis. STAT. § 48.07 (1923). Adoption proceedings, however, were governed by Wis.
STAT. § 4022 (1923).
Wis. STAT. § 4022 (1923) was renumbered to Wis. STAT.
§ 322.02 by Act of Feb. 9, 1925, ch. 4, 1925 Wis. Laws 6,29. The provisions regarding
adoption proceedings were not incorporated into Chapter 48 until 1955. Act of Aug.
20, 1955, ch. 575, § 7, 1955 Wis. Laws 719,747-50 (codified at Wis. STAT. §§ 48.81-.97
(1955)).
238. Wis. STAT. § 4022 (1898).
239. Until Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922), an adoption
could be granted on a finding of abandonment without notice to the birth parents.
See Schiltz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 2d 31, 188 N.W.2d 613 (1922); Parsons v. Parsons, 101
Wis. 76, 77 N.W. 147 (1898). In a 4-3 decision, Lacher held that the right of a parent
to his or her child was a substantial right which required adherence to the principles
of due process of law if such right could be effected by the court.
240. Schiltz v. Roenitz, 86 Wis. 31, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
241. Act of Aug. 30, 1929, ch. 439, § 7, 1929 Wis. Laws 593, 619-23.
242. Wis. STAT. § 48.07(7) (1933).
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the consent of the unwed father before an adoption could be
ordered.243 The statutes also did not recognize either a distinction between a parent who had raised a child and one
who had never seen the child, or a distinction between an
older child and an infant.
Under the early legislative scheme, adoptions were not
necessarily final upon entry of the decree. An adoption
could be annulled within two years of the entry of the adoption order if, before age fourteen, the child developed insanity, feeblemindedness, epilepsy, or venereal disease from
a condition which existed prior to the adoption and was unknown to the adoptive parents. 244 After two years parties
were estopped from avoiding the effect of the adoption order. The probation period was intended for the benefit of
the adopting parents 245 and did not expressly give the birth
mother the right to intervene during that two year period.
B.

1950-1979

In 1955 the legislature added to section 48.40(2)(d) additional grounds for involuntarily terminating parental
rights.246 First, involuntary termination was allowed upon a
finding of debauchery, habitual use of intoxicating liquor or
narcotic drugs, or repeated lewd and lascivious behavior detrimental to the health, morals and well-being of the minor.
Such a finding could be made only if the parent had been
deprived of legal custody of the child by court order at least
243. Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922) (discussing Wis.

STAT.

§ 322.04(4) (1933)). Such disparate treatment between birth mother and birth father
in the case of children born out of wedlock continued until Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 98-108. Reacting to Stanley, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court changed the law set forth in Lacher in State ex rel Lewis
v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes 184-93.
244. Wis. STAT. § 322.09 (1933).
245. Contrast this approach with Wis. STAT. §§ 48.84, .86 (1979), under which
the birth mother was given a period of time prior to the entry of the adoption order
within which to reclaim the child. See In re Adoption of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297
N.W.2d 833 (1980), rev'g 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1980). Due to the
requirement that the child reside in the home of nonrelative adopting parents for six
months before the adoption petition may be filed, the prospective adoptive family still
retains a period within which to reject the child; however, it is now before finalization
of the adoption. Wis. STAT. § 48.90(2) (1981-1982).
246. Act of Aug. 20, 1955, ch. 575, 1955 Wis. Laws 719.
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a year earlier and did not later receive legal custody. 247 Another new ground was a finding of mental deficiency rendering the parent incapable of providing "proper parental care
and protection." Lastly, the court could also now terminate
upon a finding of parental mental illness if such illness existed prior to the finding of the standard grounds for termination of parental rights.248
The creation in 1955 of Wisconsin Statute sections 48.84
and 48.86 effectively provided an opportunity for the birth
mother to consent to an adoption, have the child placed with
prospective adoptive parents and then withdraw her consent
to the adoption.249 Under these sections, parental consent to
an adoption was considered "irrevocable" once given in
writing before a judge. Before a court could allow her to
withdraw her consent, the birth mother was required to show
that the best interests of the child would be furthered by allowing her such withdrawal.25 °
Section 48.84 was enlarged in 1955 to require the consent
of a guardian before a court could approve an adoption.2
The guardian was required to file with the court written reasons for refusal to consent to the adoption. If such written
objections were filed, the court had the alternative to dismiss
the petition for adoption or to set a hearing to see if the reasons set forth were arbitrary and capricious or based on insufficient evidence. If the court made the latter finding, it
could waive the requirement of the consent.2 5 2 Absent such
a determination waiving the consent, the failure to obtain
the recommendation of the guardian would prove fatal to an
adoption.
C CurrentLegislative Proceduresfor Termination of
ParentalRights
No significant changes were made in the grounds for termination of parental rights for the next quarter of a century.
247. Wis. STAT. § 48.40(2)(d) (1957).
248. Id § 48.40(3).
249. Act of Aug. 20, 1955, ch. 575, 1955 Wis. Laws 719.
250. Wis. STAT. § 48.86 (1957).
251. Act of Aug. 20, 1955, ch. 575, 1955 Wis. Laws 719, created Wis.
§ 48.84(1)(c) (1957).
252. Wis. STAT. § 48.85 (1957).

STAT.

1983]

TERMINA TING PARENT4L RIGHTS

In 1979 the Wisconsin Legislature made wholesale revisions

to the termination statute.253 These revisions were part of a
nationwide trend to provide greater protection for birth parents in termination proceedings, to preserve existing family
units and to protect children from the consequences of le-

gally insufficient terminations due to unconstitutionally

vague statutes.254 These revisions affected the procedures for

both voluntary and involuntary termination of parental
rights.
The new law made the procedure for voluntarily consenting to the termination of one's parental rights more specific. The statute now requires a parent's consent to be taken
in a court of record. If the parent is located near the city in
which the proceedings are to take place, the parent should
appear in the proceedings and place his consent on the rec-

ord. If an appearance in that court is difficult or impossible,
any court of record in the state or in another jurisdiction
may be used.255
Putative fathers who are reluctant to become adjudicated
fathers may consent to the termination of their rights by executing an affidavit, disclaimer and consent form before a no253. Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 330, 1979 Wis. Laws 1636.
254. See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), at'd,
545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). See also In re Termination of Parental Rights to
A.M.K., 105 Wis. 2d 91, 312 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1981).
255. Wis. STAT. § 48.41(2)(a) (1981-1982) states:
(2) The court may accept a voluntary consent to termination of parental
rights only as follows:
(a) The parent appears personally at the hearing and gives his or her consent to the termination of his or her parental rights. The judge may accept the
consent only after the judge has explained the effect of termination of parental
rights and has questioned the parent and is satisfied that the consent is informed and voluntary.
Id § 48.41(2)(b) states:
(2) The court may accept a voluntary consent to termination of parental
rights only as follows:
(b) If the court finds that it would be difficult or impossible for the parent
to appear in person at the hearing, the court may accept the written consent of
the parent given before a judge of any court of record. This written consent
shall be accompanied by the signed findings of the judge who accepted the
parent's consent. These findings shall recite that the judge questioned the parent and found that the consent was informed and voluntary before the judge
accepted the consent of the parent.
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Terminations required for stepparent

adoptions may now be accomplished either by giving a consent in a court of record or by executing a properly witnessed
affidavit in which the parent being terminated consents voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences of his
or her act. 7 Where the voluntary termination of parental
rights involves a minor parent, a guardian ad litem must be
appointed and must approve the minor's consent.2 5 8 The
separate procedure permitting one to voluntarily consent to

an adoption in lieu of voluntary termination of parental

rights was abolished. 9
The involuntary termination procedure has been totally
revised.2 60 The general grounds which existed prior to September 1, 1980, and which had been in some cases clarified
by case law, were dispensed with in favor of six more specific
256. Id § 48.41(2)(c) states:
(2) The court may accept a voluntary consent to termination of parental
rights only as follows:
(c) A person who may be the father of a child born out of wedlock, but
who has not been adjudicated to be the father, may consent to the termination
of any parental rights that he may have as provided in par. (a) or (b) or by
signing a written, notarized statement which recites that he has been informed
of and understands the effect of an order to terminate parental rights and that
he voluntarily disclaims any rights that he may have to the child, including the
right to notice of proceedings under this subchapter.
257. Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 48.41(2)(d) (West Supp. 1982-1983) states:

(2) The court may accept a voluntary consent to termination of parental
rights only as follows:
(d) If the proceeding to terminate parental rights is held prior to an adoption proceeding in which the petitioner is the child's stepparent, the child's
birth parent may consent to the termination of any parental rights that he or
she may have as provided in par. (a) or (b) or by filing with the court an
affidavit witnessed by 2 persons stating that he or she has been informed of
and understands the effect of an order to terminate parental rights and that he
or she voluntarily disclaims all rights to the child, including the right to notice
of proceedings under this subchapter.
258. Wis. STAT. § 48.41(3) (1981-1982) states:
(3) The consent of a minor or incompetent person to the termination of his or
her parental rights shall not be accepted by the court unless it is joined by the
consent of his or her guardian ad litem. If the guardian ad litem joins in the
consent to the termination of parental rights with the minor or incompetent
person, minority or incompetence shall not be grounds for a later attack on the
order terminating parental rights.
259. Act of Nov. 27, 1981, ch. 81, § 13, 1981 Wis. Laws 726, 733.
260. Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 330, § 6, 1979 Wis. Laws 1636, 1637.
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and narrowly drawn grounds for involuntary termination. A
two-stage hearing procedure was established. In the first, or
factfinding, stage a jury or a court must determine whether
the grounds for termination of parental rights have been
proved by petitioner by clear and convincing evidence.26 '
After completion of the adjudicative or factfinding
phase, the court then must determine what disposition is in
the best interests of the child. The factors for determining
the child's best interests were heretofore undefined in the
statute. The legislature reaffirmed that the best interests of
the child shall be the prevailing factor to be considered by
the court and set forth six factors reflecting case law and current thinking 2 6 2 which the court may consider. 263 These factors should be considered only after the first phase of the
termination process has concluded with findings that one of
the six termination grounds has been met and that the parent
261. Sections 48.84, 48.86, 48.87 were repealed by Act of 1981, ch. 81, 1981 Wis.
Laws, following In re Adoption of R.P.R., 95 Wis. 2d 573, 291 N.W.2d 591 (Ct.
App.), rev'd, 98 Wis. 2d 613, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980).
Until the 1981 abolition of consent adoptions took place, independent or nonagency adoptions utilized the consent to adopt procedure rather than the termination
of parental rights statutes.
Prior to 1981, appointment of a guardian for the child was not required in order to
place the child for the time period beginning with the placement of the child until the
adoption was finalized at least six months later. Wis. STAT. § 48.63 (1977).
By statute only social service agencies licensed to accept guardianship over the
child could serve as guardians for adoption purposes. Wis. STAT. § 48.427(2) (1979).
Licensed agencies did not serve as guardians for nonagency placements, thus leaving prospective adoptive parents little option but to use the consent to adopt procedure. Consequently, in independent placements, a birth parent could give an
"irrevocable" consent to a child's adoption, but withdraw it with the permission of the
court and have the child taken from the prospective adoptive parents any time prior
to the adoption itself. Wis. STAT. §§ 48.84, .86 (1977). Such an option was not available to birth parents who placed their children with licensed child welfare agencies
for adoption because the termination of parental rights determination ended all rights
of the birth parents. The agency was appointed guardian and the child was then
placed with the prospective adoptive parents for a minimum of six months before the
adoption petition was filed. Wis. STAT. § 48.90(1) (1977).
262. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1979); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 30.
263. Wis. STAT. § 48.426(3) (1981-1982) states:
In considering the best interests of the child under this section the court shall
consider but not be limited to the following:
(a) The likelihood of the child's adoption after termination.
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the disposition
and, if applicable, at the time the child was removed from the home.
(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the parent or
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is unfit.2 4 It is at this latter stage that expert testimony may
be appropriate to assist the court in reaching a disposition
decision which it deems to be in the best interest of the child.
After the close of the dispositional hearing, the court has
three alternatives. First, it may dismiss the petition for termination of parental rights.265 Second, it may terminate the
parental rights of one or both parents. 266 Third, it may terminate the rights of one or both parents and place the child
in sustaining care.267 Under either the second or the third

alternative the court must also make an order determining
legal custody and transferring guardianship to one of several
possible institutions or individuals set forth in the statute. 268
The trial court must enter a judgment which sets forth its
findings and disposition. 269 The findings of fact and conclu-

sions of law must be specific and not merely restate the statutory grounds. 270 A termination judgment is considered
final, and the appeal process must begin within thirty days of
the date the order is entered. 271
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

A.

ProposedLegislative Changes

Any future legislation in the adoption or termination
area should distinguish between the involuntary termination
other family members, and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever
these relationships.
(d) The wishes of the child.
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the child.
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship as a result of the termination, taking into account the
conditions of the child's current placement, the likelihood of future placements
and the results of prior placements.
264. In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981). Exactly at what point
in the proceedings and under what circumstances the fitness or unfitness finding must
be made is not clear from the decision.
265. Wis. STAT. § 48.427(2) (1981-1982).
266. Id § 48.427(3).
267. Id § 48.427(4).
268. Id §§ 48.427(3)(a), 48.427(3)(b), 48.428.
269. Wis. STAT. § 48.43(1) (1981-1982).
270. In re Termination of Parental Rights to T.R.M., 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303
N.W.2d 581 (1981).
271. Wis. STAT. § 48.43(6) (1981-1982). See In re J.D., 106 Wis. 2d 126, 315
N.W.2d 365 (1982).
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of the rights of parents who have lived in a family relation-

ship with the child and those who have never participated in
the raising of the child. Such a distinction would be consistent with the tenor of modem United States Supreme Court

decisions dealing with termination of parental rights.2 72
Some effort to distinguish between the child who is part of a

family unit and one who is not was made in section
generally fails to take into
48.415(6), but current legislation
273
factor.
critical
account this
Section 48.415(6) permits termination of rights of a fa-

ther who failed to assume parental responsibility. 274 The
specificity of its language, however, often prevents termination of the rights of fathers in certain cases where it may be
272. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
273. It should be noted that Wis. STAT. § 48AI5(l)(b) (1981-1982) does involve
the issue of whether a relationship with the child has been developed. Under section
48.415(6) psychological parenthood is in some instances given at least inferential
consideration.
274. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(6) (1981-1982) states:
At the factfinding hearing the court may make a finding that grounds exist for
the termination of parental rights. Grounds for termination of parental rights
shall be one of the following:
(6) FAILURE TO ASSUME PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY. (a) Failure to assume parental responsibility may be established by a showing that a child has
been born out of wedlock, not subsequently legitimated or adopted, that paternity was not adjudicated prior to the filing of the petition for termination of

parental rights and:
1. The person or persons who may be the father of the child have been
given notice under s. 48.42 but have failed to appear or otherwise submit to the
jurisdiction of the court and that such person or persons have never had a
substantial parental relationship with the child; or
2. That although paternity to the child has been adjudicated under s.
48.423, the father did not establish a substantial parental relationship with the
child prior to the adjudication of paternity although the father had reason to
believe that he was the father of the child and had an opportunity to establish
a substantial parental relationship with the child.
(b) In this subsection, "substantial parental relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child. In evaluating whether the person has
had a substantial relationship with the child, the court may consider factors,
including, but not limited to, whether the person has ever expressed concern
for or interest in the support, care or well-being of the child or the mother
during her pregnancy and whether the person has neglected or refused to provide care or support even though the person had the opportunity and ability to
do so.
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in the interest of the child on the basis of the very parental
inadequacy which led to the termination proceeding. For
example, if a child is born after the father is imprisoned and
the birth mother wishes to place the child for adoption, the
father can argue that his incarceration at the time of the
birth has precluded the opportunity to establish a substantial
parental relationship with the child. Unless the court goes
beyond a literal reading of the statute to hold that the father
voluntarily deprived himself of this opportunity by committing the crimes for which he was convicted and subsequently
confined, the father's own reprehensible conduct could stand
as a complete defense to the termination of his rights, even
where termination may be in the child's best interests. Such
specificity provides substantial protection for the rights of
the parent of infants and older children alike, but may not
be appropriate when considering termination of the rights to
an infant.
The requirement that petitioner must show that respondent had an opportunity to establish a parental relationship
or the respondent's ability to use lack of an opportunity as a
defense, whichever the case may be, should be changed.
Reference to "opportunity" in section 48.415(6) should be
eliminated or reserved for those situations in which a familial relationship has existed.
The problems are not limited to section 48.415(6). Section 48.415(5) permits termination if petitioner can prove
that a parent's conduct has caused death or injury to a minor
or minors who live in the parent's household and resulted in
two or more separate felony convictions.275 Much like the
case of imposing liability on a dog owner only after the dog
has taken its second bite, petitioner must show multiple incidents of abuse causing death or injury, not just to any minor,
275. Wis. STAT. § 48.415 (1981-1982) states:
At a factfinding hearing the court may make a finding that grounds exist for
the termination of parental rights. Grounds for termination of parental rights
shall be one of the following:
(5) REPEATED ABUSE. Repeated abuse may be established by a showing
that on more than one occasion the parent has caused death or injury to a
minor or minors living in the parent's household resulting in 2 or more separate felony convictions.
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but to a minor living in the household of the parent, in order
to cross the threshold of this statute to reach consideration of
the child's best interests. Thus, in a family of three children,
it may take the death of a second child before the best interests of the third child will even be considered in a termination proceeding.276
This is not to suggest that the showing of either the failure to assume parental responsibility or the extensive allegations required to show repeated abuse should automatically
terminate the rights of a birth parent. Predicating judicial
consideration of the child's interests upon the very difficult
threshold of the current statutory grounds, however, frequently prevents a court from evaluating the best interests of
the child to determine whether the child should have an opportunity to live in a permanent and stable family unit. If
the best interests of the child are to be the focal point of
proceedings under chapter 48,277 the current statutory
scheme, which often protects the rights of the parent first and
inquires into the best interests of the child second,27 8 should
be modified to effect a more equitable balance between these
two interests. A felony conviction of child abuse should permit a court to then consider parental unfitness and the
child's best interests in the termination context.
Two grounds available for limited use are section
48.415(3),279 and section 48.415(4).280 While the concepts
276. CHIPS (child in need of protection or services) remedies may provide long
term foster placement for child number three, which could in turn lead to termination
and placement for adoption. Wis. STAT. §§ 48.345, 48.415(2) (1981-1982).
277. Wis. STAT. § 48.01(2) (1981-1982) states:
This chapter shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives contained in
this section. The best interests of the child shall always be of paramount consideration, but the court shall also consider the interest of the parents as guardian of the child, the interest of the person or persons with whom the child has
been placed for adoption and the interests of the public.
278. In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981), injected yet a third
area of inquiry into the process. After determining that one of the six grounds for
involuntary termination has been satisfied and that the parent has lived in a family
relationship with the child, a decision must be made whether the parent is unfit. Only
after the allegation has also been proven may the court examine directly the question
of the best interest of the child.
279. WIs. STAT. § 48.415(3) (1981-1982) states:
At the factfinding hearing the court may make a finding that grounds exist for
the termination of parental rights. Grounds for termination of parental rights
shall be one of the following:
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embodied in both grounds are sound, if it is appropriate to
make the threshold easier to cross so that the best interests of
the child will be given consideration more frequently, each
well-intentioned statute goes too far.

In the case of continuing parental disability, an initial
showing must be made that the parent is now and has been

for two of the preceding five years confined at certain treatment facilities on account of mental illness or developmental

disability. 8 ' It must also be shown that the parent's condi-

tion is not apt to be resolved within a certain period of time
and that the child is not receiving adequate substitute care
by the other parent or a relative or guardian. Rather than
require proof of all three elements prior to reaching the best
interests question, it should be adequate to prove the disabil-

ity. Consideration of the parent's future condition or
whether the care currently received by the child is adequate

should then be part of the evaluation of what disposition
would be in the child's best interests.

(3) CONTINUING PARENTAL DISABILITY. Continuing parental disability
may be established by a showing that:
(a) The parent is presently, and for a cumulative total period of at least 2
years within the 5 years immediately prior to the filing of the petition has been,
an inpatient at one or more hospitals as defined in s. 50.33(l)(a), (b) or (c),
licensed treatment facilities as defined in s. 51.01(2) or state treatment facilities
as defined in s. 51.01(15) on account of mental illness as defined in s.
51.01(13)(a) or (b) or developmental disability as defined in s. 55.01(2) or (5);
(b) The condition of the parent is likely to continue indefinitely; and
(c) The child is not being provided with adequate care by a relative who
has legal custody of the child, or by a parent or guardian.
280. Id § 48.415(4) states:
At the factfinding hearing the court may make a finding that grounds exist for
the termination of parental rights. Grounds for termination of parental rights
shall be one of the following:
(4) CONTINUING DENIAL OF VISITATION RIGHTS. Continuing denial of
visitation rights may be established by a showing that:
(a) The parent has been denied visitation rights by court order in an action affecting marriage;
(b) At least 2 years have elapsed since the order denying visitation rights
was issued and the court has not subsequently modified its order so as to permit visitation rights; and
(c) The parent would not be entitled to visitation rights if he or she were
to seek such rights at the time the petition for termination of parental rights is
filed.
281. Id. § 48.415(3).
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When considering termination under section 48.415(4) it
must be shown that: (1) the parent whose rights are the subject of the termination procedure is currently under an order
of the court denying his or her rights of visitation; (2) that
two years have passed since the visitation order Was entered
without modification of the order; and (3) that visitation
rights would not currently be granted if requested.282 Denial
of visitation rights as a ground may be used most frequently
in the stepparent adoption situation in which the noncustodial parent declines to voluntarily terminate parental
rights although he or she has had283
little apparent interest in
or communication with the child.
Under a termination scheme oriented to the child's interests, it should be sufficient grounds to establish the first element, with latter elements considered in determining
whether termination is in the child's interest. Eliminating
the last element would serve to eliminate a redundant layer
of proof from the petitioner's already substantial burden.
The petitioner must currently prove for the second time
those elements necessary to sustain denial of visitation as in
a divorce case. This burden may be particularly difficult if
there has been no recent information on the conduct of respondent parent who has not visited for two years.
Preservation of an existing family unit or rehabilitation
of a previously existing unit which no longer functions as a
unit serve as cornerstones for the recent reconstruction of
chapter 48. The ground for involuntary termination which
perhaps best encompasses the thrust of the modifications
made to chapter 48 is that found in section 48.415(2).284
282. Id § 48.415(4).
283. Section 48.415(4) may serve as an alternative to section 48.415(1)(a)(3)
"abandonment" in stepparent termination proceedings.
284. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(2) (1981-1982) states:
At the factfinding hearing the court may make a finding that grounds exist
for the termination of parental rights. Grounds for termination of parental
rights shall be one of the following:
(2) CONTINUING NEED OF PROTECTION OR SERVICES. Continuing need of
protection or services may be established by a showing that the child has been
adjudged to be in need of protection or services and placed, or continued in a
placement, outside his or her home pursuant to one or more court orders under
ss. 48.345, 48.347, 48.363 or 48.365 containing the notice required by s.
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Under section 48.415(2) a consideration of the termination of parental rights becomes a possibility only after the
child has been placed outside the home pursuant to an earlier adjudication. Typically the parent who has failed to fulfill his or her responsibility in such a case receives services
from a family service unit or agency after the CHIPS 285 finding is made. Under section 48.415(2) the court may later terminate parental rights after the child has been outside the
home for a year or more and the parent has consciously refused to correct problems which caused the separation of the
parent and the child in the first place. If the parent is simply
unable to improve the conditions causing the separation and
it is not likely that the conditions will be improved, the court
may terminate parental rights once the child has been
outside the home for a total of two years or more.
Recognition of the need to respect the integrity of an existing family unit, coupled with the need to protect the child
against separation from psychological as well as birth parents, makes section 48.415(2) an appropriate ground for termination of parental rights. The time periods of one year
and two years before which termination may be attempted
under this section conflict with the well-established need to
place infants for adoption at the earliest stage possible.286
However, the section will often apply to situations in which
newborn infants are not involved and in which there has
been a familial relationship between parent and child. Consequently, the time limits, although they could be shorter,
may well be appropriate. Concern for early placement of a
child would not be relevant to discussion of section 48.415(2)
48.356(2), that the agency responsible for the care of the child and the family
has made a diligent effort to provide the services required by the court, and:
(a) The child has been outside the home for a cumulative total period of
one year or longer pursuant to such orders and the parent has substantially
neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the conditions which resulted in the
removal of the child from the home; or
(b) The child has been outside the home for a cumulative total period of 2
years or longer pursuant to such orders, the parent has been unable to remedy
the conditions which resulted in the removal of the child from the home and
there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be able to remedy these
conditions in the future.
285. See id §§ 48.13, .345.
286. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 30, at 22.
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if the remaining grounds for termination of parental rights
were not so difficult to prove. Appropriate relaxation of the
other five standards in section 48.415 would better comport
with the express intent of chapter 48 to give the best interests
of the child paramount consideration.287 Section 48.415(2)
would then need little change.
The remaining ground of abandonment has considerably
more limited application than its predecessor statute.288 Unless the birth parents simply disappear and cannot be located, the time limits set forth in the current law preclude
early placement of the child. The section does not distinguish between a parent who leaves a well-established family
unit and a parent who is simply not interested in the child at
its birth.
The current statute does recognize that haphazard or incidental contact between the parent and the child should not
preclude a determination that parental rights should be in287. Wis. STAT. § 48.01(2) (1981-1982).
288. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(1) (1981-1982) states:
At the factfinding hearing the court may make a finding that grounds exist
for the termination of parental rights. Grounds for termination of parental
rights shall be one of the following:
(1)

ABANDONMENT. (a)

Abandonment may be established by a show-

ing that:
1. The child has been left without provision for its care or support, the
petitioner has investigated the circumstances surrounding the matter and for
60 days the petitioner has been unable to find either parent;
2. The child has been placed, or continued in a placement, outside the
parent's home by a court order containing the notice required by s. 48.356(2)
and the parent has failed to visit or communicate with the child for a period of
6 months or longer, or
3. The child has been left by the parent with a relative or other person,
the parent knows or could discover the whereabouts of the child and the parent has failed to visit or communicate with the child for a period of one year or
longer.
(b) Incidental contact between parent and child shall not preclude the
court from finding that the parent has failed to visit or communicate with the
child under par. (a) 2 or 3. The time periods under par. (a) 2 or 3 shall not
include any periods during which the parent has been prohibited by judicial
order from visiting or communicating with the child.
(c) A showing under par. (a) that abandonment has occurred may be
rebutted by other evidence that the parent has not disassociated himself or
herself from the child or relinquished responsibility for the child's care and
well-being.
Cf. Wis. STAT. § 48.40(2)(a) (1977) (court may, upon petition, terminate all rights of
parents to a minor if it finds that the parents have abandoned the minor).
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voluntarily terminated. The statute thus implicitly acknowledges that abandonment should properly be viewed from the
child's perspective rather than the parents'. This acknowledgement is not uniformly applied throughout this section.
Under section 48.415(l)(c), some parental activity, though
carried out beyond the knowledge of the child or custodian,
may preclude a finding that the child has been left without
provision for care or support. For example, a parent could
claim he or she established a college fund for the child or
sent funds for the current support of the child which were
returned to the parent. Even though unknown to the child
or the custodian, the action may defeat termination because
"the parent has not disassociated himself or herself from the
child. ' 289 In another example, although less clear, an unwed
father could claim he had no notice of the birth, and that his
lack of concern for the child was not an intentional disassociation of himself from the child.
A more general definition of abandonment without time
limits would give the court or jury an opportunity to consider the totality of the parent's conduct before290 and after
the birth of the child. Under neither the current law nor the
recommended change does a finding of abandonment result
in automatic termination of parental rights. It represents
only the first threshold that must be crossed by a petitioner.
In some cases, fitness or unfitness must then be proved. Finally, the court must be satisfied that the best interests of the
child will be furthered before the termination may occur.
Loosening the abandonment requirement would properly allow more cases to reach the best interests phase.
The increased specificity in section 48.415, although providing greater protections for biological parents, has reduced
judicial flexibility to deal with the rights and best interests of
the child. Previous statutory grounds were not in all cases
specific and definite and there did exist a risk of unjust infringement of the rights of a birth parent to the child. However, resulting statutory changes and contemporaneous
289. Wis. STAT. § 48.415(6) (1981-1982).
290. See State ex rel Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d
643 (1975) (discussion of father's conduct prior to the child's birth which constitutes a
basis for terminating his parental rights).
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common-law development involving particularly the termination of rights of unwed parents to infants have served to
subordinate the interests of the child to the rights of a biological parent.
Under the new procedure, the best interests of the child
are often not examined by the court unless the court or jury
has first determined that the conduct of the birth parent
mandates intervention in the parent-child relationship. The
statute does not recognize the concept of psychological
parenthood as a factor to be considered when determining
whether an involuntary termination of parental rights
should take place unless the factfinding phase concludes that
the statutory grounds have been proven. The statute also
does not consider the difference to the child between a parent who has never lived with the child and one who has lived
on a regular basis with the child. No distinction based on
the age of the child is considered.
Those identified - deficiencies are covered in the final
hearing stage; but many cases will never reach that phase
because the limited and narrow grounds available under the
first phase make it unlikely that parents of newborns will fail
the initial test. Broadening of the grounds is one answer.
Evaluation of broadened grounds in a one-stage proceeding
which also considers directly the best interests of the child
represents another solution. The latter would lessen the risk
of subordination of the child's interests to the parents' rights.
B. ProposedJudicial Changes
Although adoption is primarily a statutory proceeding,
there are two areas where further judicial action is warranted. The first involves the role of the guardian ad litem.
The second involves further development of the judicially
required finding of unfitness.
1. The Role of the Guardian ad Litem
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's application of section
48.85 to guardians ad litem should be eliminated. By so doing, there would be no question that the guardian ad litem is
to serve as an advocate for the child's best interests and not
as referee for the court. The elimination of the recommendation of the guardian ad litem is not apt to have a practical
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effect upon decisionmaking in adoption matters. Courts
have seldom addressed the issue of the weight to be given to
the opinion of the guardian and certainly have seldom given
it presumptive weight. The elimination of the recomendation procedure should also remove from the lawyer serving
as guardian ad litem the burden of acting as a social worker,
psychologist or psychiatrist, roles for which few lawyers
have been properly trained.
Similarly, the interests of all parties to termination or
adoption proceedings would be better served if the presumptive weight currently given to the opinion of the guardian by
section 48.85 is also eliminated. The guardian's report
should be treated simply as a part of the evidence presented,
leaving to the court the attribution of appropriate weight to
its content.
The requirement that a guardian ad litem make a recommendation under section 48.85 was expanded by the court
without concomitant analysis of the procedural implications. 91 If neither the courts nor the legislature choose to
end the practice of providing a recommendation by a guardian ad litem, specific procedures should be enunciated to
better define the role and importance of the guardian ad
litem.
2. The Requirement of Unfitness
The unfitness doctrine enunciated in In re JL.W 292 deserves additional attention and development by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The court's constitutional
characterization of this requirement should mute criticism of
the case as an act of judicial legislation so long as its application is limited to situations involving a parent who has established a familial relationship with the child. The court's
holding in JL. W, however, may go beyond this limitation
to a blanket application of the unfitness determination to all
termination or adoption proceedings.
Such an extended application of a constitutional requirement of unfitness would be unfortunate for two reasons.
The United States Supreme Court has distinguished between
291. See In re Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d 64, 227 N.W. 2d 634 (1975).
292. 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981).
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the rights of parents who have established a familial relationship with their children and those of parents who have
not. The Court also appears to differentiate between situa-

tions involving infants and those involving older children.293
The blanket application of an unfitness requirement, therefore, cannot be supported by reference to the federal consti-

tution. Blanket application of an unfitness requirement in
all situations imposes judicial rigidity on often markedly different situations requiring maximum flexibility.
Several important questions remain to be answered by
the Wisconsin court. First, when a finding of unfitness is re-

quired, the court (or the legislature) should identify the stage
in the proceeding where the determination of this issue
falls.294 Perhaps a parent in a familial relationship with the
child should have to be found unfit after the grounds for termination are proven. 95 Second, if there is no familial relationship, the question arises whether the finding of unfitness
should be dispensed with or whether the parent should have
to prove his fitness. Finally, a definition of "unfitness" is

essential. 96 The need for finality of placement for the child

at the earliest moment makes prompt resolution of the above
issues a matter of paramount judicial consideration.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If nothing else, analysis of judicial treatment of termination and adoption proceedings, as well as analysis of the
293. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
294. In the opinion of the writers, unfitness and proof of grounds are logically
related since both criteria focus on the parent. However, if unfitness is not for the
jury, either a three stage proceeding is required or unfitness must fall in stage two, the
best interest stage, so that evidence on the subject of unfitness will not unduly
prejudice a jury determination on the issue of grounds to terminate.
295. It is arguable that proof of grounds as set forth in section 48.415(l)(b) constitutes a determination of unfitness of the parent. Until In re J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118,
306 N.W.2d 46 (1981), that would have seemed to be the case. Does petitioner now
have to prove, for example, under section 48.415(5) that respondent severely beat a
minor in the same household two or more times resulting in two or more separate
felony convictions and also prove that respondent is unfit? The holding in .L. W.
would seem to require that. The court may have intended unfitness as an alternative
to section 48.415. In those cases in which there is no familial relationship, petitioner
would then need to show unfitness, not grounds under section 48.415.
296. It is not clear whether unfitness is a question of fact, a question of law or a
mixed question of fact and law.
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Wisconsin Legislature's involvement therein, indicates that
this is an area fraught with significant and often conflicting
concerns. The legislative effort which made wholesale modifications to the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights was both necessary and commendable.
However, the result produced statutes which may either be
of limited use 297 or may have been made so specific as to
leave little flexibility in their application by the court. This
has often resulted in a juxtaposition of the rights of the parent and the child in terms of protections to be offered each.
The unfortunate consequence will not be that fewer terminations of parental rights take place than occurred under
the predecessor statute, but that courts will have fewer opportunities to evaluate directly the best interests of the children and thereby give consideration to such salient factors as
the age of the child and the presence of the child in a family
unit.
Current statutes and case law appropriately protect the
right of a parent to continue to raise a child who is part of a
viable family unit. Inadequate protection exists for the child
who is not yet a member of a family unit or who has the
misfortune to no longer be a part of a viable family unit.
Such inadequacies are reflected not only in the difficult hurdles petitioner must overcome before the child's best interests are considered, but also in the imprecise guidelines
which govern the actions of the child's guardian ad litem.
A definite conclusion to the issues raised by J.L. W. must
be provided by either the courts or the legislature in order to
prevent a multitude of protracted legal battles over children.
Such delays in securing final placement will leave the most
innocent participant in the proceeding with the longest lasting scar.
297. See Wis. STAT. §§ 48.415(3) -.415(5) (1981-1982).

